--export' into the Nix store, and optionally check the cryptographic
signatures against /nix/etc/nix/signing-key.pub. (TODO: verify
against a set of public keys.)
path. This is like `nix-store --dump', only it also dumps the
meta-information of the store path (references, deriver). Will add
a `--sign' flag later to add a cryptographic signature, which we
will use for exchanging store paths between build farm machines in a
secure manner.
from a source directory. All files for which a predicate function
returns true are copied to the store. Typical example is to leave
out the .svn directory:
stdenv.mkDerivation {
...
src = builtins.filterSource
(path: baseNameOf (toString path) != ".svn")
./source-dir;
# as opposed to
# src = ./source-dir;
}
This is important because the .svn directory influences the hash in
a rather unpredictable and variable way.
`nix-store --delete'. But unprivileged users are not allowed to
ignore liveness.
* `nix-store --delete --ignore-liveness': ignore the runtime roots as
well.
process, so forward the operation.
* Spam the user about GC misconfigurations (NIX-71).
* findRoots: skip all roots that are unreadable - the warnings with
which we spam the user should be enough.
processes can register indirect roots. Of course, there is still
the problem that the garbage collector can only read the targets of
the indirect roots when it's running as root...
mode. Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user.
The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so
the caller can be completely unprivileged.
This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since
the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on.
Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user
files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure
store operations.
Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off
a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket.
That would be even more secure.
