- darwin installer: delete hardware report, not necessary
- moves os-specific code from the darwin installer to to `poly_*`
functions
- adds profile.d support to the profile targets, which automatically
handles many distros which don't have a /etc/bashrc but do have an
/etc/profile.d
- /bin/bash -> /usr/bin/env bash
- document why each excluded shellcheck check is excluded
- rename the multi-user to Daemon-based
In this mode, the following restrictions apply:
* The builtins currentTime, currentSystem and storePath throw an
error.
* $NIX_PATH and -I are ignored.
* fetchGit and fetchMercurial require a revision hash.
* fetchurl and fetchTarball require a sha256 attribute.
* No file system access is allowed outside of the paths returned by
fetch{Git,Mercurial,url,Tarball}. Thus 'nix build -f ./foo.nix' is
not allowed.
Thus, the evaluation result is completely reproducible from the
command line arguments. E.g.
nix build --pure-eval '(
let
nix = fetchGit { url = https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git; rev = "9c927de4b179a6dd210dd88d34bda8af4b575680"; };
nixpkgs = fetchGit { url = https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git; ref = "release-17.09"; rev = "66b4de79e3841530e6d9c6baf98702aa1f7124e4"; };
in (import (nix + "/release.nix") { inherit nix nixpkgs; }).build.x86_64-linux
)'
The goal is to enable completely reproducible and traceable
evaluation. For example, a NixOS configuration could be fully
described by a single Git commit hash. 'nixos-rebuild' would do
something like
nix build --pure-eval '(
(import (fetchGit { url = file:///my-nixos-config; rev = "..."; })).system
')
where the Git repository /my-nixos-config would use further fetchGit
calls or Git externals to fetch Nixpkgs and whatever other
dependencies it has. Either way, the commit hash would uniquely
identify the NixOS configuration and allow it to reproduced.
This removes the file nix-mode.el from Nix. The file is now available within the
repository https://github.com/NixOS/nix-mode.
Fixes#662Fixes#1040Fixes#1054Fixes#1055Closes#1119Fixes#1419
NOTE: all of the above should be fixed within NixOS/nix-mode. If one of those
hasn’t please reopen within NixOS/nix-mode and not within NixOS/nix.
This prevents builders from setting the S_ISUID or S_ISGID bits,
preventing users from using a nixbld* user to create a setuid/setgid
binary to interfere with subsequent builds under the same nixbld* uid.
This is based on aszlig's seccomp code
(47f587700d).
Reported by Linus Heckemann.
And add a 116 KiB ash shell from busybox to the release build. This
helps to make sandbox builds work out of the box on non-NixOS systems
and with diverted stores.
Build logs on cache.nixos.org are compressed using Brotli (since this
allows them to be decompressed automatically by Chrome and Firefox),
so it's handy if "nix log" can decompress them.
Disabled hardened build because it makes the linker fail with messages like
relocation R_X86_64_PC32 against undefined symbol `BZ2_bzWriteOpen' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Harden_All_Packages.
Right now it only tests whether seccomp correctly forges the return
value of chown, but the long-term goal is to test the full sandboxing
functionality at some point in the future.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
We're going to use libseccomp instead of creating the raw BPF program,
because we have different syscall numbers on different architectures.
Although our initial seccomp rules will be quite small it really doesn't
make sense to generate the raw BPF program because we need to duplicate
it and/or make branches on every single architecture we want to suuport.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
The SSHStore PR adds this functionality to the daemon, but we have to
handle the case where the Nix daemon is 1.11.
Also, don't require signatures for trusted users. This restores 1.11
behaviour.
Fixes https://github.com/NixOS/hydra/issues/398.
This was observed in the deb_debian7x86_64 build:
http://hydra.nixos.org/build/29973215
Calling c_str() on a temporary should be fine because the temporary
shouldn't be destroyed until after the execl() call, but who knows...
There is really no conceivable reason why building Nix would need
access to the host's nix.conf. If it does, it's a bug, and we should
fix that instead.
Jörg Thalheim