Commit graph

117 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eelco Dolstra bdadb98de8 * `nix-store --import' now also works in remote mode. The worker
always requires a signature on the archive.  This is to ensure that
  unprivileged users cannot add Trojan horses to the Nix store.
2007-02-21 17:34:02 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 0f5da8a83c * Support exportPath() in remote mode. 2007-02-21 16:34:00 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 43c4d18c6a * nix-store --import': import an archive created by nix-store
--export' into the Nix store, and optionally check the cryptographic
  signatures against /nix/etc/nix/signing-key.pub.  (TODO: verify
  against a set of public keys.)
2007-02-21 15:45:32 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra b824a1daee * Start of `nix-store --export' operation for serialising a store
path.  This is like `nix-store --dump', only it also dumps the
  meta-information of the store path (references, deriver).  Will add
  a `--sign' flag later to add a cryptographic signature, which we
  will use for exchanging store paths between build farm machines in a
  secure manner.
2007-02-20 23:17:20 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra a3e6415ba8 * New primop builtins.filterSource, which can be used to filter files
from a source directory.  All files for which a predicate function
  returns true are copied to the store.  Typical example is to leave
  out the .svn directory:

    stdenv.mkDerivation {
      ...
      src = builtins.filterSource
        (path: baseNameOf (toString path) != ".svn")
        ./source-dir;
      # as opposed to
      #   src = ./source-dir;
    }

  This is important because the .svn directory influences the hash in
  a rather unpredictable and variable way.
2006-12-12 23:05:01 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra a9c4f66cfb * Allow unprivileged users to run the garbage collector and to do
`nix-store --delete'.  But unprivileged users are not allowed to
  ignore liveness.
* `nix-store --delete --ignore-liveness': ignore the runtime roots as
  well.
2006-12-05 02:18:46 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 29cf434a35 * The determination of the root set should be made by the privileged
process, so forward the operation.
* Spam the user about GC misconfigurations (NIX-71).
* findRoots: skip all roots that are unreadable - the warnings with
  which we spam the user should be enough.
2006-12-05 01:31:45 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 74033a844f * Add indirect root registration to the protocol so that unprivileged
processes can register indirect roots.  Of course, there is still
  the problem that the garbage collector can only read the targets of
  the indirect roots when it's running as root...
2006-12-04 23:29:16 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 4740baf3a6 * When NIX_REMOTE=daemon, connect to /nix/var/nix/daemon.socket
instead of forking a worker.
2006-12-04 14:21:39 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra f5f0cf423f * Refactoring. 2006-12-04 13:28:14 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 4251f94b32 * Use a Unix domain socket instead of pipes. 2006-12-03 02:36:44 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 7951c3c546 * Some hackery to propagate the worker's stderr and exceptions to the
client.
2006-12-03 02:08:13 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra e25fad691a * Move addTempRoot() to the store API, and add another function
syncWithGC() to allow clients to register GC roots without needing
  write access to the global roots directory or the GC lock.
2006-12-02 16:41:36 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra a824d58b56 * Merge addToStore and addToStoreFixed.
* addToStore now adds unconditionally, it doesn't use readOnlyMode.
  Read-only operation is up to the caller (who can call
  computeStorePathForPath).
2006-12-01 20:51:18 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 0565b5f2b3 * More remote operations.
* Added new operation hasSubstitutes(), which is more efficient than
  querySubstitutes().size() > 0.
2006-11-30 22:43:55 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 765bdfe542 * When NIX_REMOTE is set to "slave", fork off nix-worker in slave
mode.  Presumably nix-worker would be setuid to the Nix store user.
  The worker performs all operations on the Nix store and database, so
  the caller can be completely unprivileged.

  This is already much more secure than the old setuid scheme, since
  the worker doesn't need to do Nix expression evaluation and so on.
  Most importantly, this means that it doesn't need to access any user
  files, with all resulting security risks; it only performs pure
  store operations.

  Once this works, it is easy to move to a daemon model that forks off
  a worker for connections established through a Unix domain socket.
  That would be even more secure.
2006-11-30 19:54:43 +00:00
Eelco Dolstra 9adc074dc3 * Oops. 2006-11-30 18:35:50 +00:00