In EvalState::checkSourcePath, the path is checked against the list of
allowed paths first and later it's checked again *after* resolving
symlinks.
The resolving of the symlinks is done via canonPath, which also strips
out "../" and "./". However after the canonicalisation the error message
pointing out that the path is not allowed prints the symlink target in
the error message.
Even if we'd suppress the message, symlink targets could still be leaked
if the symlink target doesn't exist (in this case the error is thrown in
canonPath).
So instead, we now do canonPath() without symlink resolving first before
even checking against the list of allowed paths and then later do the
symlink resolving and checking the allowed paths again.
The first call to canonPath() should get rid of all the "../" and "./",
so in theory the only way to leak a symlink if the attacker is able to
put a symlink in one of the paths allowed by restricted evaluation mode.
For the latter I don't think this is part of the threat model, because
if the attacker can write to that path, the attack vector is even
larger.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
This particular `shell` variable wasn't used, since a new one was
declared in the only side of the `if` branch that used a `shell`
variable.
It could realistically confuse developers thinking it could use `$SHELL`
under some situations.
forceValue() were called after a value is copied effectively forcing only one of the copies keeping another copy not evaluated.
This resulted in its evaluation of the same lazy value more than once (the number of hits is not big though)
Not ready for this yet, causes the prompt to disappear in nix repl
and more generally can overwrite non-progress-bar messages.
This reverts commit 44de71a396.
Before:
$ command time nix-prefetch-url https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-4.17.6.tar.xz
1.19user 1.02system 0:41.96elapsed 5%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 182720maxresident)k
After:
1.38user 1.05system 0:39.73elapsed 6%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 16204maxresident)k
Note however that addToStore() can still take a lot of memory
(e.g. RemoteStore::addToStore() is constant space, but
LocalStore::addToStore() isn't; that's fixed by
c94b4fc7ee
though).
Fixes#1400.
For example, this allows you to do run nix-daemon as a non-privileged
user:
eelco$ NIX_STATE_DIR=~/my-nix/nix/var nix-daemon --store ~/my-nix/
The NIX_STATE_DIR is still needed because settings.nixDaemonSocketFile
is not derived from settings.storeUri (and we can't derive it from the
store's state directory because we don't want to open the store in the
parent process).
As proposed in #1634 the `nix search` command could use some
improvements. Initially 0413aeb35d added
some basic sorting behavior using `std::map`, a next step would be an
improvement of the output.
This patch includes the following changes:
* Use `$PAGER` for outputs with `RunPager` from `shared.hh`:
The same behavior is defined for `nix-env --query`, furthermore it
makes searching huge results way easier.
* Simplified result blocks:
The new output is heavily inspired by the output from `nox`, the first
line shows the attribute path and the derivaiton name
(`attribute path (derivation name)`) and the description in the second
line.
We have automated builds at https://hub.docker.com/r/nixos/nix/ now. The master
branch of the "docker" repository is available as "latest". Branches that match
the regular expression "^[0-9.]+$" are pushed to the tag that corresponds to
their branch name. Other branches are ignored.
Samuel Dionne-Riel
Linus Heckemann
Maximilian Bosch