Includes the expression of the condition in the assertion message if
the assertion failed, making assertions much easier to debug. eg.
error: assertion (withPython -> (python2Packages != null)) failed at pkgs/tools/security/nmap/default.nix:11:1
This prevents them from being inlined. On gcc 9, this reduces the
stack size needed for
nix-instantiate '<nixpkgs>' -A texlive.combined.scheme-full --dry-run
from 12.9 MiB to 4.8 MiB.
Most functions now take a StorePath argument rather than a Path (which
is just an alias for std::string). The StorePath constructor ensures
that the path is syntactically correct (i.e. it looks like
<store-dir>/<base32-hash>-<name>). Similarly, functions like
buildPaths() now take a StorePathWithOutputs, rather than abusing Path
by adding a '!<outputs>' suffix.
Note that the StorePath type is implemented in Rust. This involves
some hackery to allow Rust values to be used directly in C++, via a
helper type whose destructor calls the Rust type's drop()
function. The main issue is the dynamic nature of C++ move semantics:
after we have moved a Rust value, we should not call the drop function
on the original value. So when we move a value, we set the original
value to bitwise zero, and the destructor only calls drop() if the
value is not bitwise zero. This should be sufficient for most types.
Also lots of minor cleanups to the C++ API to make it more modern
(e.g. using std::optional and std::string_view in some places).
The FunctionCallTrace object consumes a few hundred bytes of stack
space, even when tracing is disabled. This was causing stack overflows:
$ nix-instantiate '<nixpkgs> -A texlive.combined.scheme-full --dry-run
error: stack overflow (possible infinite recursion)
This is with the default stack size of 8 MiB.
Putting the object on the heap reduces stack usage to < 5 MiB.
With this patch, and this file I called `log.py`:
#!/usr/bin/env nix-shell
#!nix-shell -i python3 -p python3 --pure
import sys
from pprint import pprint
stack = []
timestack = []
for line in open(sys.argv[1]):
components = line.strip().split(" ", 2)
if components[0] != "function-trace":
continue
direction = components[1]
components = components[2].rsplit(" ", 2)
loc = components[0]
_at = components[1]
time = int(components[2])
if direction == "entered":
stack.append(loc)
timestack.append(time)
elif direction == "exited":
dur = time - timestack.pop()
vst = ";".join(stack)
print(f"{vst} {dur}")
stack.pop()
and:
nix-instantiate --trace-function-calls -vvvv ../nixpkgs/pkgs/top-level/release.nix -A unstable > log.matthewbauer 2>&1
./log.py ./log.matthewbauer > log.matthewbauer.folded
flamegraph.pl --title matthewbauer-post-pr log.matthewbauer.folded > log.matthewbauer.folded.svg
I can make flame graphs like: http://gsc.io/log.matthewbauer.folded.svg
---
Includes test cases around function call failures and tryEval. Uses
RAII so the finish is always called at the end of the function.
In EvalState::checkSourcePath, the path is checked against the list of
allowed paths first and later it's checked again *after* resolving
symlinks.
The resolving of the symlinks is done via canonPath, which also strips
out "../" and "./". However after the canonicalisation the error message
pointing out that the path is not allowed prints the symlink target in
the error message.
Even if we'd suppress the message, symlink targets could still be leaked
if the symlink target doesn't exist (in this case the error is thrown in
canonPath).
So instead, we now do canonPath() without symlink resolving first before
even checking against the list of allowed paths and then later do the
symlink resolving and checking the allowed paths again.
The first call to canonPath() should get rid of all the "../" and "./",
so in theory the only way to leak a symlink if the attacker is able to
put a symlink in one of the paths allowed by restricted evaluation mode.
For the latter I don't think this is part of the threat model, because
if the attacker can write to that path, the attack vector is even
larger.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
puck
Linus Heckemann
