While trying to use an alternate directory for my Nix installation, I
noticed that nix's output didn't reflect the updated state
directory. This patch corrects that and now prints the warning before
attempting to create the directory (if the directory creation fails,
it wouldn't have been obvious why nix was attempting to create the
directory in the first place).
With this patch, I now get the following warning:
warning: '/home/deck/.var/app/org.nixos.nix/var/nix' does not
exist, so Nix will use '/home/deck/.local/share/nix/root' as a
chroot store
These settings seem harmless, they control the same polling
functionality that timeout does, but with different behavior. Should
be safe for untrusted users to pass in.
I just had a colleague get confused by the previous phrase for good
reason. "valid" sounds like an *objective* criterion, e.g. and *invalid
signature* would be one that would be trusted by no one, e.g. because it
misformatted or something.
What is actually going is that there might be a signature which is
perfectly valid to *someone else*, but not to the user, because they
don't trust the corresponding public key. This is a *subjective*
criterion, because it depends on the arbitrary and personal choice of
which public keys to trust.
I therefore think "trustworthy" is a better adjective to use. Whether
something is worthy of trust is clearly subjective, and then "trust"
within that word nicely evokes `trusted-public-keys` and friends.
- call close explicitly in writeFile to prevent the close exception
from being ignored
- fsync after writing schema file to flush data to disk
- fsync schema file parent to flush metadata to disk
https://github.com/NixOS/nix/issues/7064
Remove the `verify TLS: Nix CA file = 'blah'` message that Nix used to print when fetching anything as it's both useless (`libcurl` prints the same info in its logs) and misleading (gives the impression that a new TLS connection is being established which might not be the case because of multiplexing. See #7011 )
Implements the approach suggested by feedback on PR #6994, where
tempdir paths are created in the store (now with an exclusive lock).
As part of this work, the currently-broken and unused
`createTempDirInStore` function is updated to create an exclusive lock
on the temp directory in the store.
The GC now makes a non-blocking attempt to lock any store directories
that "look like" the temp directories created by this function, and if
it can't acquire one, ignores the directory.
readDerivation is pretty slow, and while it may not be significant for
some use cases, on things like ghc-nix where we have thousands of
derivations is really slows things down.
So, this just doesn’t do the impure derivation check if the impure
derivation experimental feature is disabled. Perhaps we could cache
the result of isPure() and keep the check, but this is a quick fix to
for the slowdown introduced with impure derivations features in 2.8.0.
This hang for some reason didn't trigger in the Nix build, but did
running 'make installcheck' interactively. What happened:
* Store::addMultipleToStore() calls a SinkToSource object to copy a
path, which in turn calls LegacySSHStore::narFromPath(), which
acquires a connection.
* The SinkToSource object is not destroyed after the last bytes has
been read, so the coroutine's stack is still alive and its
destructors are not run. So the connection is not released.
* Then when the next path is copied, because max-connections = 1,
LegacySSHStore::narFromPath() hangs forever waiting for a connection
to be released.
The fix is to make sure that the source object is destroyed when we're
done with it.
RewritingSink can handle being fed input where a reference crosses a
chunk boundary. we don't need to load the whole source into memory, and
in fact *not* loading the whole source lets nix build FODs that do not
fit into memory (eg fetchurl'ing data files larger than system memory).
Once a derivation goal has been completed, we check whether or not
this goal was meant to be repeated to check its output.
An early return branch was preventing the worker to reach that repeat
code branch, hence breaking the --check command (#2619).
It seems like this early return branch is an artifact of a passed
refactoring. As far as I can tell, buildDone's main branch also
cleanup the tmp directory before returning.
By default, Nix sets the "cores" setting to the number of CPUs which are
physically present on the machine. If cgroups are used to limit the CPU
and memory consumption of a large Nix build, the OOM killer may be
invoked.
For example, consider a GitLab CI pipeline which builds a large software
package. The GitLab runner spawns a container whose CPU is limited to 4
cores and whose memory is limited to 16 GiB. If the underlying machine
has 64 cores, Nix will invoke the build with -j64. In many cases, that
level of parallelism will invoke the OOM killer and the build will
completely fail.
This change sets the default value of "cores" to be
ceil(cpu_quota / cpu_period), with a fallback to
std:🧵:hardware_concurrency() if cgroups v2 is not detected.
The workaround for "Some distros patch Linux" mentioned in
local-derivation-goal.cc will not help in the `--option
sandbox-fallback false` case. To provide the user more helpful
guidance on how to get the sandbox working, let's check to see if the
`/proc` node created by the aforementioned patch is present and
configured in a way that will cause us problems. If so, give the user
a suggestion for how to troubleshoot the problem.
local-derivation-goal.cc contains a comment stating that "Some distros
patch Linux to not allow unprivileged user namespaces." Let's give a
pointer to a common version of this patch for those who want more
details about this failure mode.
This commit causes nix to `warn()` if sandbox setup has failed and
`/proc/self/ns/user` does not exist. This is usually a sign that the
kernel was compiled without `CONFIG_USER_NS=y`, which is required for
sandboxing.
This commit uses `warn()` to notify the user if sandbox setup fails
with errno==EPERM and /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces is missing or
zero, since that is at least part of the reason why sandbox setup
failed.
Note that `echo -n 0 > /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces` or
equivalent at boot time has been the recommended mitigation for
several Linux LPE vulnerabilities over the past few years. Many users
have applied this mitigation and then forgotten that they have done
so.
Winter Cute