readDerivation is pretty slow, and while it may not be significant for
some use cases, on things like ghc-nix where we have thousands of
derivations is really slows things down.
So, this just doesn’t do the impure derivation check if the impure
derivation experimental feature is disabled. Perhaps we could cache
the result of isPure() and keep the check, but this is a quick fix to
for the slowdown introduced with impure derivations features in 2.8.0.
This hang for some reason didn't trigger in the Nix build, but did
running 'make installcheck' interactively. What happened:
* Store::addMultipleToStore() calls a SinkToSource object to copy a
path, which in turn calls LegacySSHStore::narFromPath(), which
acquires a connection.
* The SinkToSource object is not destroyed after the last bytes has
been read, so the coroutine's stack is still alive and its
destructors are not run. So the connection is not released.
* Then when the next path is copied, because max-connections = 1,
LegacySSHStore::narFromPath() hangs forever waiting for a connection
to be released.
The fix is to make sure that the source object is destroyed when we're
done with it.
RewritingSink can handle being fed input where a reference crosses a
chunk boundary. we don't need to load the whole source into memory, and
in fact *not* loading the whole source lets nix build FODs that do not
fit into memory (eg fetchurl'ing data files larger than system memory).
Once a derivation goal has been completed, we check whether or not
this goal was meant to be repeated to check its output.
An early return branch was preventing the worker to reach that repeat
code branch, hence breaking the --check command (#2619).
It seems like this early return branch is an artifact of a passed
refactoring. As far as I can tell, buildDone's main branch also
cleanup the tmp directory before returning.
By default, Nix sets the "cores" setting to the number of CPUs which are
physically present on the machine. If cgroups are used to limit the CPU
and memory consumption of a large Nix build, the OOM killer may be
invoked.
For example, consider a GitLab CI pipeline which builds a large software
package. The GitLab runner spawns a container whose CPU is limited to 4
cores and whose memory is limited to 16 GiB. If the underlying machine
has 64 cores, Nix will invoke the build with -j64. In many cases, that
level of parallelism will invoke the OOM killer and the build will
completely fail.
This change sets the default value of "cores" to be
ceil(cpu_quota / cpu_period), with a fallback to
std:🧵:hardware_concurrency() if cgroups v2 is not detected.
The workaround for "Some distros patch Linux" mentioned in
local-derivation-goal.cc will not help in the `--option
sandbox-fallback false` case. To provide the user more helpful
guidance on how to get the sandbox working, let's check to see if the
`/proc` node created by the aforementioned patch is present and
configured in a way that will cause us problems. If so, give the user
a suggestion for how to troubleshoot the problem.
local-derivation-goal.cc contains a comment stating that "Some distros
patch Linux to not allow unprivileged user namespaces." Let's give a
pointer to a common version of this patch for those who want more
details about this failure mode.
This commit causes nix to `warn()` if sandbox setup has failed and
`/proc/self/ns/user` does not exist. This is usually a sign that the
kernel was compiled without `CONFIG_USER_NS=y`, which is required for
sandboxing.
This commit uses `warn()` to notify the user if sandbox setup fails
with errno==EPERM and /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces is missing or
zero, since that is at least part of the reason why sandbox setup
failed.
Note that `echo -n 0 > /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces` or
equivalent at boot time has been the recommended mitigation for
several Linux LPE vulnerabilities over the past few years. Many users
have applied this mitigation and then forgotten that they have done
so.
The failure modes for nix's sandboxing setup are pretty complicated.
When nix is unable to set up the sandbox, let's provide more detail
about what went wrong. Specifically:
* Make sure the error message includes the word "sandbox" so the user
knows that the failure was related to sandboxing.
* If `--option sandbox-fallback false` was provided, and removing it
would have allowed further attempts to make progress, let the user
know.
Specifically, if we're not root and the daemon socket does not exist,
then we use ~/.local/share/nix/root as a chroot store. This enables
non-root users to download nix-static and have it work out of the box,
e.g.
ubuntu@ip-10-13-1-146:~$ ~/nix run nixpkgs#hello
warning: '/nix' does not exists, so Nix will use '/home/ubuntu/.local/share/nix/root' as a chroot store
Hello, world!
With this, Nix will write a copy of the sandbox shell to /bin/sh in
the sandbox rather than bind-mounting it from the host filesystem.
This makes /bin/sh work out of the box with nix-static, i.e. you no
longer get
/nix/store/qa36xhc5gpf42l3z1a8m1lysi40l9p7s-bootstrap-stage4-stdenv-linux/setup: ./configure: /bin/sh: bad interpreter: No such file or directory
This allows changes to nix-cache-info to be picked up by existing
clients. Previously, the only way for this to happen would be for
clients to delete binary-cache-v6.sqlite, which is quite awkward for
users.
On the other hand, updates to nix-cache-info should be pretty rare,
hence the choice of a fairly long TTL. Configurability is probably not
useful enough to warrant implementing it.
Winter Cute
Linus Heckemann