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8 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eelco Dolstra d2875f6782 Fix tests 2019-04-08 16:11:36 +02:00
aszlig 43e28a1b75
Fix symlink leak in restricted eval mode
In EvalState::checkSourcePath, the path is checked against the list of
allowed paths first and later it's checked again *after* resolving
symlinks.

The resolving of the symlinks is done via canonPath, which also strips
out "../" and "./". However after the canonicalisation the error message
pointing out that the path is not allowed prints the symlink target in
the error message.

Even if we'd suppress the message, symlink targets could still be leaked
if the symlink target doesn't exist (in this case the error is thrown in
canonPath).

So instead, we now do canonPath() without symlink resolving first before
even checking against the list of allowed paths and then later do the
symlink resolving and checking the allowed paths again.

The first call to canonPath() should get rid of all the "../" and "./",
so in theory the only way to leak a symlink if the attacker is able to
put a symlink in one of the paths allowed by restricted evaluation mode.

For the latter I don't think this is part of the threat model, because
if the attacker can write to that path, the attack vector is even
larger.

Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
2018-08-03 06:46:43 +02:00
Eelco Dolstra ca14b14200
Use boost::format from the boost package
Note that this only requires headers from boost so it doesn't add a
runtime dependency.

Also, use Nixpkgs 18.03.
2018-03-14 19:24:04 +01:00
Eelco Dolstra 43f8ef73c6
realiseContext(): Add derivation outputs to the allowed paths
This makes import-from-derivation work in restricted mode again.
2018-02-06 15:38:45 +01:00
Eelco Dolstra d4dcffd643
Add pure evaluation mode
In this mode, the following restrictions apply:

* The builtins currentTime, currentSystem and storePath throw an
  error.

* $NIX_PATH and -I are ignored.

* fetchGit and fetchMercurial require a revision hash.

* fetchurl and fetchTarball require a sha256 attribute.

* No file system access is allowed outside of the paths returned by
  fetch{Git,Mercurial,url,Tarball}. Thus 'nix build -f ./foo.nix' is
  not allowed.

Thus, the evaluation result is completely reproducible from the
command line arguments. E.g.

  nix build --pure-eval '(
    let
      nix = fetchGit { url = https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git; rev = "9c927de4b179a6dd210dd88d34bda8af4b575680"; };
      nixpkgs = fetchGit { url = https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git; ref = "release-17.09"; rev = "66b4de79e3841530e6d9c6baf98702aa1f7124e4"; };
    in (import (nix + "/release.nix") { inherit nix nixpkgs; }).build.x86_64-linux
  )'

The goal is to enable completely reproducible and traceable
evaluation. For example, a NixOS configuration could be fully
described by a single Git commit hash. 'nixos-rebuild' would do
something like

  nix build --pure-eval '(
    (import (fetchGit { url = file:///my-nixos-config; rev = "..."; })).system
  ')

where the Git repository /my-nixos-config would use further fetchGit
calls or Git externals to fetch Nixpkgs and whatever other
dependencies it has. Either way, the commit hash would uniquely
identify the NixOS configuration and allow it to reproduced.
2018-01-16 19:23:18 +01:00
Eelco Dolstra 193330d321
Test: Replace --option with the corresponding flag 2017-11-20 17:50:49 +01:00
Eelco Dolstra 812e027e1d
Add option allowed-uris
This allows network access in restricted eval mode.
2017-10-30 12:41:49 +01:00
Eelco Dolstra fc6a032989 Add tests for restricted eval mode 2016-04-14 15:24:06 +02:00