Move ValidPathInfo to its own header

src/libstore/nar-info.cc

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #include "globals.hh"
 #include "nar-info.hh"
+#include "store-api.hh"
 
 namespace nix {
 

src/libstore/nar-info.hh

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 #include "types.hh"
 #include "hash.hh"
-#include "store-api.hh"
+#include "path-info.hh"
 
 namespace nix {
 

src/libstore/path-info.hh

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+#pragma once
+
+// TODO many of thes eare not needed.
+#include "path.hh"
+#include "hash.hh"
+#include "content-address.hh"
+#include "serialise.hh"
+#include "crypto.hh"
+#include "lru-cache.hh"
+#include "sync.hh"
+#include "globals.hh"
+#include "config.hh"
+
+#include <limits>
+#include <string>
+#include <optional>
+
+namespace nix {
+
+
+class Store;
+
+struct ValidPathInfo
+{
+    StorePath path;
+    std::optional<StorePath> deriver;
+    Hash narHash;
+    StorePathSet references;
+    time_t registrationTime = 0;
+    uint64_t narSize = 0; // 0 = unknown
+    uint64_t id; // internal use only
+
+    /* Whether the path is ultimately trusted, that is, it's a
+       derivation output that was built locally. */
+    bool ultimate = false;
+
+    StringSet sigs; // note: not necessarily verified
+
+    /* If non-empty, an assertion that the path is content-addressed,
+       i.e., that the store path is computed from a cryptographic hash
+       of the contents of the path, plus some other bits of data like
+       the "name" part of the path. Such a path doesn't need
+       signatures, since we don't have to trust anybody's claim that
+       the path is the output of a particular derivation. (In the
+       extensional store model, we have to trust that the *contents*
+       of an output path of a derivation were actually produced by
+       that derivation. In the intensional model, we have to trust
+       that a particular output path was produced by a derivation; the
+       path then implies the contents.)
+
+       Ideally, the content-addressability assertion would just be a Boolean,
+       and the store path would be computed from the name component, ‘narHash’
+       and ‘references’. However, we support many types of content addresses.
+    */
+    std::optional<ContentAddress> ca;
+
+    bool operator == (const ValidPathInfo & i) const
+    {
+        return
+            path == i.path
+            && narHash == i.narHash
+            && references == i.references;
+    }
+
+    /* Return a fingerprint of the store path to be used in binary
+       cache signatures. It contains the store path, the base-32
+       SHA-256 hash of the NAR serialisation of the path, the size of
+       the NAR, and the sorted references. The size field is strictly
+       speaking superfluous, but might prevent endless/excessive data
+       attacks. */
+    std::string fingerprint(const Store & store) const;
+
+    void sign(const Store & store, const SecretKey & secretKey);
+
+    /* Return true iff the path is verifiably content-addressed. */
+    bool isContentAddressed(const Store & store) const;
+
+    static const size_t maxSigs = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
+
+    /* Return the number of signatures on this .narinfo that were
+       produced by one of the specified keys, or maxSigs if the path
+       is content-addressed. */
+    size_t checkSignatures(const Store & store, const PublicKeys & publicKeys) const;
+
+    /* Verify a single signature. */
+    bool checkSignature(const Store & store, const PublicKeys & publicKeys, const std::string & sig) const;
+
+    Strings shortRefs() const;
+
+    ValidPathInfo(const ValidPathInfo & other) = default;
+
+    ValidPathInfo(StorePath && path) : path(std::move(path)) { };
+    ValidPathInfo(const StorePath & path) : path(path) { };
+
+    virtual ~ValidPathInfo() { }
+};
+
+typedef list<ValidPathInfo> ValidPathInfos;
+}

src/libstore/store-api.hh

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include "globals.hh"
 #include "config.hh"
 #include "derivations.hh"
+#include "path-info.hh"
 
 #include <atomic>
 #include <limits>
@@ -111,83 +112,6 @@ struct SubstitutablePathInfo
 
 typedef std::map<StorePath, SubstitutablePathInfo> SubstitutablePathInfos;
 
-struct ValidPathInfo
-{
-    StorePath path;
-    std::optional<StorePath> deriver;
-    Hash narHash;
-    StorePathSet references;
-    time_t registrationTime = 0;
-    uint64_t narSize = 0; // 0 = unknown
-    uint64_t id; // internal use only
-
-    /* Whether the path is ultimately trusted, that is, it's a
-       derivation output that was built locally. */
-    bool ultimate = false;
-
-    StringSet sigs; // note: not necessarily verified
-
-    /* If non-empty, an assertion that the path is content-addressed,
-       i.e., that the store path is computed from a cryptographic hash
-       of the contents of the path, plus some other bits of data like
-       the "name" part of the path. Such a path doesn't need
-       signatures, since we don't have to trust anybody's claim that
-       the path is the output of a particular derivation. (In the
-       extensional store model, we have to trust that the *contents*
-       of an output path of a derivation were actually produced by
-       that derivation. In the intensional model, we have to trust
-       that a particular output path was produced by a derivation; the
-       path then implies the contents.)
-
-       Ideally, the content-addressability assertion would just be a Boolean,
-       and the store path would be computed from the name component, ‘narHash’
-       and ‘references’. However, we support many types of content addresses.
-    */
-    std::optional<ContentAddress> ca;
-
-    bool operator == (const ValidPathInfo & i) const
-    {
-        return
-            path == i.path
-            && narHash == i.narHash
-            && references == i.references;
-    }
-
-    /* Return a fingerprint of the store path to be used in binary
-       cache signatures. It contains the store path, the base-32
-       SHA-256 hash of the NAR serialisation of the path, the size of
-       the NAR, and the sorted references. The size field is strictly
-       speaking superfluous, but might prevent endless/excessive data
-       attacks. */
-    std::string fingerprint(const Store & store) const;
-
-    void sign(const Store & store, const SecretKey & secretKey);
-
-    /* Return true iff the path is verifiably content-addressed. */
-    bool isContentAddressed(const Store & store) const;
-
-    static const size_t maxSigs = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
-
-    /* Return the number of signatures on this .narinfo that were
-       produced by one of the specified keys, or maxSigs if the path
-       is content-addressed. */
-    size_t checkSignatures(const Store & store, const PublicKeys & publicKeys) const;
-
-    /* Verify a single signature. */
-    bool checkSignature(const Store & store, const PublicKeys & publicKeys, const std::string & sig) const;
-
-    Strings shortRefs() const;
-
-    ValidPathInfo(const ValidPathInfo & other) = default;
-
-    ValidPathInfo(StorePath && path) : path(std::move(path)) { };
-    ValidPathInfo(const StorePath & path) : path(path) { };
-
-    virtual ~ValidPathInfo() { }
-};
-
-typedef list<ValidPathInfo> ValidPathInfos;
-
 
 enum BuildMode { bmNormal, bmRepair, bmCheck };