Merge pull request #8180 from obsidiansystems/factor-out-daemon-cmd-helpers
Tidy up and comment daemon CLI
This commit is contained in:
commit
8f0ec323ea
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@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
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///@file
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#include "command.hh"
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#include "shared.hh"
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#include "local-store.hh"
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@ -34,6 +36,19 @@
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using namespace nix;
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using namespace nix::daemon;
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/**
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* Settings related to authenticating clients for the Nix daemon.
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*
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* For pipes we have little good information about the client side, but
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* for Unix domain sockets we do. So currently these options implemented
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* mandatory access control based on user names and group names (looked
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* up and translated to UID/GIDs in the CLI process that runs the code
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* in this file).
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*
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* No code outside of this file knows about these settings (this is not
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* exposed in a header); all authentication and authorization happens in
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* `daemon.cc`.
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*/
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struct AuthorizationSettings : Config {
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Setting<Strings> trustedUsers{
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@ -54,7 +69,9 @@ struct AuthorizationSettings : Config {
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> directories that are otherwise inacessible to them.
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)"};
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/* ?Who we trust to use the daemon in safe ways */
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/**
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* Who we trust to use the daemon in safe ways
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*/
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Setting<Strings> allowedUsers{
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this, {"*"}, "allowed-users",
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R"(
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@ -112,8 +129,36 @@ static void setSigChldAction(bool autoReap)
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throw SysError("setting SIGCHLD handler");
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}
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/**
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* @return Is the given user a member of this group?
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*
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* @param user User specified by username.
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*
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* @param group Group the user might be a member of.
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*/
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static bool matchUser(std::string_view user, const struct group & gr)
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{
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for (char * * mem = gr.gr_mem; *mem; mem++)
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if (user == std::string_view(*mem)) return true;
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return false;
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}
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bool matchUser(const std::string & user, const std::string & group, const Strings & users)
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/**
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* Does the given user (specified by user name and primary group name)
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* match the given user/group whitelist?
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*
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* If the list allows all users: Yes.
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*
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* If the username is in the set: Yes.
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*
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* If the groupname is in the set: Yes.
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*
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* If the user is in another group which is in the set: yes.
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*
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* Otherwise: No.
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*/
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static bool matchUser(const std::string & user, const std::string & group, const Strings & users)
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{
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if (find(users.begin(), users.end(), "*") != users.end())
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return true;
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@ -126,8 +171,7 @@ bool matchUser(const std::string & user, const std::string & group, const String
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if (group == i.substr(1)) return true;
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struct group * gr = getgrnam(i.c_str() + 1);
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if (!gr) continue;
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for (char * * mem = gr->gr_mem; *mem; mem++)
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if (user == std::string(*mem)) return true;
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if (matchUser(user, *gr)) return true;
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}
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return false;
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@ -145,7 +189,9 @@ struct PeerInfo
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};
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// Get the identity of the caller, if possible.
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/**
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* Get the identity of the caller, if possible.
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*/
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static PeerInfo getPeerInfo(int remote)
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{
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PeerInfo peer = { false, 0, false, 0, false, 0 };
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@ -179,6 +225,9 @@ static PeerInfo getPeerInfo(int remote)
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#define SD_LISTEN_FDS_START 3
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/**
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* Open a store without a path info cache.
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*/
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static ref<Store> openUncachedStore()
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{
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Store::Params params; // FIXME: get params from somewhere
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@ -187,7 +236,44 @@ static ref<Store> openUncachedStore()
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return openStore(settings.storeUri, params);
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}
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/**
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* Authenticate a potential client
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*
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* @param peer Information about other end of the connection, the client which
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* wants to communicate with us.
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*
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* @return A pair of a `TrustedFlag`, whether the potential client is trusted,
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* and the name of the user (useful for printing messages).
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*
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* If the potential client is not allowed to talk to us, we throw an `Error`.
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*/
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static std::pair<TrustedFlag, std::string> authPeer(const PeerInfo & peer)
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{
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TrustedFlag trusted = NotTrusted;
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struct passwd * pw = peer.uidKnown ? getpwuid(peer.uid) : 0;
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std::string user = pw ? pw->pw_name : std::to_string(peer.uid);
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struct group * gr = peer.gidKnown ? getgrgid(peer.gid) : 0;
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std::string group = gr ? gr->gr_name : std::to_string(peer.gid);
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const Strings & trustedUsers = authorizationSettings.trustedUsers;
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const Strings & allowedUsers = authorizationSettings.allowedUsers;
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if (matchUser(user, group, trustedUsers))
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trusted = Trusted;
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if ((!trusted && !matchUser(user, group, allowedUsers)) || group == settings.buildUsersGroup)
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throw Error("user '%1%' is not allowed to connect to the Nix daemon", user);
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return { trusted, std::move(user) };
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}
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/**
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* Run a server. The loop opens a socket and accepts new connections from that
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* socket.
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*/
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static void daemonLoop()
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{
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if (chdir("/") == -1)
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@ -231,23 +317,9 @@ static void daemonLoop()
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closeOnExec(remote.get());
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TrustedFlag trusted = NotTrusted;
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PeerInfo peer = getPeerInfo(remote.get());
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struct passwd * pw = peer.uidKnown ? getpwuid(peer.uid) : 0;
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std::string user = pw ? pw->pw_name : std::to_string(peer.uid);
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struct group * gr = peer.gidKnown ? getgrgid(peer.gid) : 0;
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std::string group = gr ? gr->gr_name : std::to_string(peer.gid);
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Strings trustedUsers = authorizationSettings.trustedUsers;
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Strings allowedUsers = authorizationSettings.allowedUsers;
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if (matchUser(user, group, trustedUsers))
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trusted = Trusted;
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if ((!trusted && !matchUser(user, group, allowedUsers)) || group == settings.buildUsersGroup)
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throw Error("user '%1%' is not allowed to connect to the Nix daemon", user);
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auto [_trusted, user] = authPeer(peer);
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auto trusted = _trusted;
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printInfo((std::string) "accepted connection from pid %1%, user %2%" + (trusted ? " (trusted)" : ""),
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peer.pidKnown ? std::to_string(peer.pid) : "<unknown>",
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@ -294,11 +366,16 @@ static void daemonLoop()
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}
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}
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static void runDaemon(bool stdio)
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{
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if (stdio) {
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if (auto store = openUncachedStore().dynamic_pointer_cast<RemoteStore>()) {
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auto conn = store->openConnectionWrapper();
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/**
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* Forward a standard IO connection to the given remote store.
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*
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* We just act as a middleman blindly ferry output between the standard
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* input/output and the remote store connection, not processing anything.
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*
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* Loops until standard input disconnects, or an error is encountered.
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*/
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static void forwardStdioConnection(RemoteStore & store) {
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auto conn = store.openConnectionWrapper();
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int from = conn->from.fd;
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int to = conn->to.fd;
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@ -325,14 +402,38 @@ static void runDaemon(bool stdio)
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return;
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}
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}
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} else {
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}
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/**
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* Process a client connecting to us via standard input/output
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*
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* Unlike `forwardStdioConnection()` we do process commands ourselves in
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* this case, not delegating to another daemon.
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*
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* @note `Trusted` is unconditionally passed because in this mode we
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* blindly trust the standard streams. Limiting access to those is
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* explicitly not `nix-daemon`'s responsibility.
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*/
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static void processStdioConnection(ref<Store> store)
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{
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FdSource from(STDIN_FILENO);
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FdSink to(STDOUT_FILENO);
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/* Auth hook is empty because in this mode we blindly trust the
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standard streams. Limiting access to those is explicitly
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not `nix-daemon`'s responsibility. */
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processConnection(openUncachedStore(), from, to, Trusted, NotRecursive);
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processConnection(store, from, to, Trusted, NotRecursive);
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}
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/**
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* Entry point shared between the new CLI `nix daemon` and old CLI
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* `nix-daemon`.
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*/
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static void runDaemon(bool stdio)
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{
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if (stdio) {
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auto store = openUncachedStore();
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if (auto remoteStore = store.dynamic_pointer_cast<RemoteStore>())
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forwardStdioConnection(*remoteStore);
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else
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processStdioConnection(store);
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} else
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daemonLoop();
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}
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