Also allow "." as an installable to refer to the flake in the current
directory. E.g.
$ nix build .
will build 'provides.defaultPackage' in the flake in the current
directory.
Unlike file://<path>, this allows the path to be a dirty Git tree, so
nix build /path/to/flake:attr
is a convenient way to test building a local flake.
The general syntax for an installable is now
<flakeref>:<attrpath>. The attrpath is relative to the flake's
'provides.packages' or 'provides' if the former doesn't yield a
result. E.g.
$ nix build nixpkgs:hello
is equivalent to
$ nix build nixpkgs:packages.hello
Also, '<flakeref>:' can be omitted, in which case it defaults to
'nixpkgs', e.g.
$ nix build hello
This allows using an arbitrary "provides" attribute from the specified
flake. For example:
nix build --flake nixpkgs packages.hello
(Maybe provides.packages should be used for consistency...)
We want to encourage a brave new world of hermetic evaluation for
source-level reproducibility, so flakes should not poke around in the
filesystem outside of their explicit dependencies.
Note that the default installation source remains impure in that it
can refer to mutable flakes, so "nix build nixpkgs.hello" still works
(and fetches the latest nixpkgs, unless it has been pinned by the
user).
A problem with pure evaluation is that builtins.currentSystem is
unavailable. For the moment, I've hard-coded "x86_64-linux" in the
nixpkgs flake. Eventually, "system" should be a flake function
argument.
For example, github:edolstra/dwarffs is more-or-less equivalent to
https://github.com/edolstra/dwarffs.git. It's a much faster way to get
GitHub repositories: it fetches tarballs rather than entire Git
repositories. It also allows fetching specific revisions by hash
without specifying a ref (e.g. a branch name):
github:edolstra/dwarffs/41c0c1bf292ea3ac3858ff393b49ca1123dbd553
Previously, plain derivation paths in the string context (e.g. those
that arose from builtins.storePath on a drv file, not those that arose
from accessing .drvPath of a derivation) were treated somewhat like
derivaiton paths derived from .drvPath, except their dependencies
weren't recursively added to the input set. With this change, such
plain derivation paths are simply treated as paths and added to the
source inputs set accordingly, simplifying context handling code and
removing the inconsistency. If drvPath-like behavior is desired, the
.drv file can be imported and then .drvPath can be accessed.
This is a backwards-incompatibility, but storePath is never used on
drv files within nixpkgs and almost never used elsewhere.
SRI hashes (https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/) combine the hash algorithm and
a base-64 hash. This allows more concise and standard hash
specifications. For example, instead of
import <nix/fetchurl.nl> {
url = https://nixos.org/releases/nix/nix-2.1.3/nix-2.1.3.tar.xz;
sha256 = "5d22dad058d5c800d65a115f919da22938c50dd6ba98c5e3a183172d149840a4";
};
you can write
import <nix/fetchurl.nl> {
url = https://nixos.org/releases/nix/nix-2.1.3/nix-2.1.3.tar.xz;
hash = "sha256-XSLa0FjVyADWWhFfkZ2iKTjFDda6mMXjoYMXLRSYQKQ=";
};
In fixed-output derivations, the outputHashAlgo is no longer mandatory
if outputHash specifies the hash (either as an SRI or in the old
"<type>:<hash>" format).
'nix hash-{file,path}' now print hashes in SRI format by default. I
also reverted them to use SHA-256 by default because that's what we're
using most of the time in Nixpkgs.
Suggested by @zimbatm.
This is already done by coerceToString(), provided that the argument
is a path (e.g. 'fetchGit ./bla'). It fixes the handling of URLs like
git@github.com:owner/repo.git. It breaks 'fetchGit "./bla"', but that
was never intended to work anyway and is inconsistent with other
builtin functions (e.g. 'readFile "./bla"' fails).
Using a 64bit integer on 32bit systems will come with a bit of a
performance overhead, but given that Nix doesn't use a lot of integers
compared to other types, I think the overhead is negligible also
considering that 32bit systems are in decline.
The biggest advantage however is that when we use a consistent integer
size across all platforms it's less likely that we miss things that we
break due to that. One example would be:
https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/44233
On Hydra it will evaluate, because the evaluator runs on a 64bit
machine, but when evaluating the same on a 32bit machine it will fail,
so using 64bit integers should make that consistent.
While the change of the type in value.hh is rather easy to do, we have a
few more options available for doing the conversion in the lexer:
* Via an #ifdef on the architecture and using strtol() or strtoll()
accordingly depending on which architecture we are. For the #ifdef
we would need another AX_COMPILE_CHECK_SIZEOF in configure.ac.
* Using istringstream, which would involve copying the value.
* As we're already using boost, lexical_cast might be a good idea.
Spoiler: I went for the latter, first of all because lexical_cast does
have an overload for const char* and second of all, because it doesn't
involve copying around the input string. Also, because istringstream
seems to come with a bigger overhead than boost::lexical_cast:
https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/release/doc/html/boost_lexical_cast/performance.html
The first method (still using strtol/strtoll) also wasn't something I
pursued further, because it is also locale-aware which I doubt is what
we want, given that the regex for int is [0-9]+.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
Fixes: #2339
The current usage technically works by putting multiple different
repos in to the same git directory. However, it is very slow as
Git tries very hard to find common commits between the two
repositories. If the two repositories are large (like Nixpkgs and
another long-running project,) it is maddeningly slow.
This change busts the cache for existing deployments, but users
will be promptly repaid in per-repository performance.
In EvalState::checkSourcePath, the path is checked against the list of
allowed paths first and later it's checked again *after* resolving
symlinks.
The resolving of the symlinks is done via canonPath, which also strips
out "../" and "./". However after the canonicalisation the error message
pointing out that the path is not allowed prints the symlink target in
the error message.
Even if we'd suppress the message, symlink targets could still be leaked
if the symlink target doesn't exist (in this case the error is thrown in
canonPath).
So instead, we now do canonPath() without symlink resolving first before
even checking against the list of allowed paths and then later do the
symlink resolving and checking the allowed paths again.
The first call to canonPath() should get rid of all the "../" and "./",
so in theory the only way to leak a symlink if the attacker is able to
put a symlink in one of the paths allowed by restricted evaluation mode.
For the latter I don't think this is part of the threat model, because
if the attacker can write to that path, the attack vector is even
larger.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
forceValue() were called after a value is copied effectively forcing only one of the copies keeping another copy not evaluated.
This resulted in its evaluation of the same lazy value more than once (the number of hits is not big though)
Jonas Chevalier
Linus Heckemann