forked from lix-project/lix
manual: note that __sandboxProfile allows bypassing the darwin sandbox
(but only if it is set to relaxed. no security hole here.)
Thanks to lilyball for pointing out this omission in the docs.
Change-Id: I2408a943bfe817fe660fe1c8fefef898aaf5f7e9
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@ -36,7 +36,10 @@ All users of the Lix daemon may do the following to bring things into the Nix st
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- Input-addressed, so they are run in the sandbox with no network access, with the following exceptions:
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- The (poorly named, since it is not *just* about chroot) property `__noChroot` is set on the derivation and `sandbox` is set to `relaxed`.
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- On macOS, the derivation property `__darwinAllowLocalNetworking` allows network access to localhost from input-addressed derivations regardless of the `sandbox` setting value. This property exists with such semantics because macOS has no network namespace equivalent to isolate individual processes' localhost networking.
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- On macOS, the derivation property `__darwinAllowLocalNetworking` allows network access to localhost from input-addressed derivations regardless of the `sandbox` setting value.
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This property exists with such semantics because macOS has no network namespace equivalent to isolate individual processes' localhost networking.
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- On macOS, the derivation property `__sandboxProfile` accepts extra sandbox profile S-expressions, allowing derivations to bypass arbitrary parts of the sandbox without altogether disabling it.
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This is only permitted when `sandbox` is set to `relaxed`.
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- Output-addressed, so they are run with network access but their result must match an expected hash.
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Trusted users may set any setting, including `sandbox = false`, so the sandbox state can be different at runtime from what is described in `nix.conf` for builds invoked with such settings.
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