bindings to be used in Nix's own Perl scripts.
The only downside is that Perl XS and Automake/libtool don't really
like each other, so building is a bit tricky.
the contents of any of the given store paths have been modified.
E.g.
$ nix-store --verify-path $(nix-store -qR /var/run/current-system)
path `/nix/store/m2smyiwbxidlprfxfz4rjlvz2c3mg58y-etc' was modified! expected hash `fc87e271c5fdf179b47939b08ad13440493805584b35e3014109d04d8436e7b8', got `20f1a47281b3c0cbe299ce47ad5ca7340b20ab34246426915fce0ee9116483aa'
All paths are checked; the exit code is 1 if any path has been
modified, 0 otherwise.
This should also fix:
nix-instantiate: ./../boost/shared_ptr.hpp:254: T* boost::shared_ptr<T>::operator->() const [with T = nix::StoreAPI]: Assertion `px != 0' failed.
which was caused by hashDerivationModulo() calling the ‘store’
object (during store upgrades) before openStore() assigned it.
prevents files from being evaluated and stored as values multiple
times. For instance, evaluation of the ‘system’ attribute in NixOS
causes ‘nixpkgs/pkgs/lib/lists.nix’ to be evaluated 2019 times.
Caching gives a modest speedup and a decent memory footprint
reduction (e.g., from 1.44s to 1.28s, and from 81 MiB to 59 MiB with
GC_INITIAL_HEAP_SIZE=100000 on my system).
directory
/home/eelco/src/stdenv-updates
that you want to use as the directory for import such as
with (import <nixpkgs> { });
then you can say
$ nix-build -I nixpkgs=/home/eelco/src/stdenv-updates
brackets, e.g.
import <nixpkgs/pkgs/lib>
are resolved by looking them up relative to the elements listed in
the search path. This allows us to get rid of hacks like
import "${builtins.getEnv "NIXPKGS_ALL"}/pkgs/lib"
The search path can be specified through the ‘-I’ command-line flag
and through the colon-separated ‘NIX_PATH’ environment variable,
e.g.,
$ nix-build -I /etc/nixos ...
If a file is not found in the search path, an error message is
lazily thrown.
derivations added to the store by clients have "correct" output
paths (meaning that the output paths are computed by hashing the
derivation according to a certain algorithm). This means that a
malicious user could craft a special .drv file to build *any*
desired path in the store with any desired contents (so long as the
path doesn't already exist). Then the attacker just needs to wait
for a victim to come along and install the compromised path.
For instance, if Alice (the attacker) knows that the latest Firefox
derivation in Nixpkgs produces the path
/nix/store/1a5nyfd4ajxbyy97r1fslhgrv70gj8a7-firefox-5.0.1
then (provided this path doesn't already exist) she can craft a .drv
file that creates that path (i.e., has it as one of its outputs),
add it to the store using "nix-store --add", and build it with
"nix-store -r". So the fake .drv could write a Trojan to the
Firefox path. Then, if user Bob (the victim) comes along and does
$ nix-env -i firefox
$ firefox
he executes the Trojan injected by Alice.
The fix is to have the Nix daemon verify that derivation outputs are
correct (in addValidPath()). This required some refactoring to move
the hash computation code to libstore.