libstore/build: always enable seccomp filtering and no-new-privileges

Seccomp filtering and the no-new-privileges functionality improve the security
of the sandbox, and have been enabled by default for a long time. In
lix-project/lix#265 it was decided that they
should be enabled unconditionally. Accordingly, remove the allow-new-privileges
(which had weird behavior anyway) and filter-syscall settings, and force the
security features on. Syscall filtering can still be enabled at build time to
support building on architectures libseccomp doesn't support.

Change-Id: Iedbfa18d720ae557dee07a24f69b2520f30119cb

doc/manual/redirects.js

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ const redirects = {
     "chap-writing-nix-expressions": "language/index.html",
     "part-command-ref": "command-ref/command-ref.html",
     "conf-allow-import-from-derivation": "command-ref/conf-file.html#conf-allow-import-from-derivation",
-    "conf-allow-new-privileges": "command-ref/conf-file.html#conf-allow-new-privileges",
     "conf-allowed-uris": "command-ref/conf-file.html#conf-allowed-uris",
     "conf-allowed-users": "command-ref/conf-file.html#conf-allowed-users",
     "conf-auto-optimise-store": "command-ref/conf-file.html#conf-auto-optimise-store",

doc/manual/rl-next/linux-sandbox-consistency.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+synopsis: Enforce syscall filtering and no-new-privileges on Linux
+cls: 1063
+category: Breaking Changes
+credits: alois31
+---
+
+In order to improve consistency of the build environment, system call filtering and no-new-privileges are now unconditionally enabled on Linux.
+The `filter-syscalls` and `allow-new-privileges` options which could be used to disable these features under some circumstances have been removed.
+
+In order to support building on architectures without libseccomp support, the option to disable syscall filtering at build time remains.
+However, other uses of this option are heavily discouraged, since it would reduce the security of the sandbox substantially.

doc/manual/src/installation/prerequisites-source.md

@@ -68,10 +68,7 @@ The most current alternative to this section is to read `package.nix` and see wh
     may also work, but ancient versions like the ubiquitous 2.5.4a
     won't.
 
-  - The `libseccomp` is used to provide syscall filtering on Linux. This
-    is an optional dependency and can be disabled passing a
-    `--disable-seccomp-sandboxing` option to the `configure` script (Not
-    recommended unless your system doesn't support `libseccomp`). To get
+  - The `libseccomp` is used to provide syscall filtering on Linux. To get
     the library, visit <https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp>.
 
   - On 64-bit x86 machines only, `libcpuid` library

meson.build

@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ deps += cpuid
 # seccomp only makes sense on Linux
 seccomp_required = is_linux ? get_option('seccomp-sandboxing') : false
 seccomp = dependency('libseccomp', 'seccomp', required : seccomp_required, version : '>=2.5.5')
+if is_linux and not seccomp.found()
+  warning('Sandbox security is reduced because libseccomp has not been found! Please provide libseccomp if it supports your CPU architecture.')
+endif
 configdata += {
   'HAVE_SECCOMP': seccomp.found().to_int(),
 }

src/libstore/build/local-derivation-goal.cc

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 /* Includes required for chroot support. */
 #if __linux__
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include "linux/fchmodat2-compat.hh"
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <netinet/ip.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
@@ -44,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
+#include "linux/fchmodat2-compat.hh"
 #include <seccomp.h>
 #endif
 #define pivot_root(new_root, put_old) (syscall(SYS_pivot_root, new_root, put_old))
@@ -1612,7 +1612,6 @@ void LocalDerivationGoal::chownToBuilder(const Path & path)
 void setupSeccomp()
 {
 #if __linux__
-    if (!settings.filterSyscalls) return;
 #if HAVE_SECCOMP
     scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
 
@@ -1678,15 +1677,18 @@ void setupSeccomp()
         seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(fsetxattr), 0) != 0)
         throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
 
-    if (seccomp_attr_set(ctx, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, settings.allowNewPrivileges ? 0 : 1) != 0)
+    // Set the NO_NEW_PRIVS prctl flag.
+    // This both makes loading seccomp filters work for unprivileged users,
+    // and is an additional security measure in its own right.
+    if (seccomp_attr_set(ctx, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 1) != 0)
         throw SysError("unable to set 'no new privileges' seccomp attribute");
 
     if (seccomp_load(ctx) != 0)
         throw SysError("unable to load seccomp BPF program");
 #else
-    throw Error(
-        "seccomp is not supported on this platform; "
-        "you can bypass this error by setting the option 'filter-syscalls' to false, but note that untrusted builds can then create setuid binaries!");
+    // Still set the no-new-privileges flag if libseccomp is not available.
+    if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+        throw SysError("PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed");
 #endif
 #endif
 }
@@ -1954,10 +1956,6 @@ void LocalDerivationGoal::runChild()
                 throw SysError("setuid failed");
 
             setUser = false;
-
-            // Make sure we can't possibly gain new privileges in the sandbox
-            if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
-                throw SysError("PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed");
         }
 #endif
 

src/libstore/globals.hh

@@ -912,29 +912,6 @@ public:
         )"};
 
 #if __linux__
-    Setting<bool> filterSyscalls{
-        this, true, "filter-syscalls",
-        R"(
-          Whether to prevent certain dangerous system calls, such as
-          creation of setuid/setgid files or adding ACLs or extended
-          attributes. Only disable this if you're aware of the
-          security implications.
-        )"};
-
-    Setting<bool> allowNewPrivileges{
-        this, false, "allow-new-privileges",
-        R"(
-          (Linux-specific.) By default, builders on Linux cannot acquire new
-          privileges by calling setuid/setgid programs or programs that have
-          file capabilities. For example, programs such as `sudo` or `ping`
-          will fail. (Note that in sandbox builds, no such programs are
-          available unless you bind-mount them into the sandbox via the
-          `sandbox-paths` option.) You can allow the use of such programs by
-          enabling this option. This is impure and usually undesirable, but
-          may be useful in certain scenarios (e.g. to spin up containers or
-          set up userspace network interfaces in tests).
-        )"};
-
     Setting<StringSet> ignoredAcls{
         this, {"security.selinux", "system.nfs4_acl", "security.csm"}, "ignored-acls",
         R"(

src/libstore/linux/fchmodat2-compat.hh

@@ -20,18 +20,16 @@
 #pragma once
 ///@file
 
-#if HAVE_SECCOMP
-#  if defined(__alpha__)
-#    define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 562
-#  elif defined(__x86_64__) && SIZE_MAX == 0xFFFFFFFF // x32
-#    define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 1073742276
-#  elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__mips64) && defined(_ABIN64) // mips64/n64
-#    define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 5452
-#  elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__mips64) && defined(_ABIN32) // mips64/n32
-#    define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 6452
-#  elif defined(__mips__) && defined(_ABIO32) // mips32
-#    define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 4452
-#  else
-#    define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 452
-#  endif
-#endif // HAVE_SECCOMP
+#if defined(__alpha__)
+#  define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 562
+#elif defined(__x86_64__) && SIZE_MAX == 0xFFFFFFFF // x32
+#  define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 1073742276
+#elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__mips64) && defined(_ABIN64) // mips64/n64
+#  define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 5452
+#elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__mips64) && defined(_ABIN32) // mips64/n32
+#  define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 6452
+#elif defined(__mips__) && defined(_ABIO32) // mips32
+#  define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 4452
+#else
+#  define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 452
+#endif

src/libstore/meson.build

@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ libstore = library(
     seccomp,
     sqlite,
     sodium,
-    seccomp,
     curl,
     openssl,
     aws_sdk,

tests/nixos/default.nix

@@ -184,7 +184,9 @@ in
 
   symlinkResolvconf = runNixOSTestFor "x86_64-linux" ./symlink-resolvconf.nix;
 
-  rootInSandbox = runNixOSTestFor "x86_64-linux" ./root-in-sandbox;
+  noNewPrivilegesInSandbox = runNixOSTestFor "x86_64-linux" ./no-new-privileges/sandbox.nix;
+
+  noNewPrivilegesOutsideSandbox = runNixOSTestFor "x86_64-linux" ./no-new-privileges/no-sandbox.nix;
 
   broken-userns = runNixOSTestFor "x86_64-linux" ./broken-userns.nix;
 

tests/nixos/no-new-privileges/no-sandbox.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+let
+  inherit (import ../util.nix) mkNixBuildTest;
+in
+mkNixBuildTest {
+  name = "no-new-privileges-outside-sandbox";
+  extraMachineConfig =
+    { pkgs, ... }:
+    {
+      security.wrappers.ohno = {
+        owner = "root";
+        group = "root";
+        capabilities = "cap_sys_nice=eip";
+        source = "${pkgs.libcap}/bin/getpcaps";
+      };
+      nix.settings = {
+        extra-sandbox-paths = [ "/run/wrappers/bin/ohno" ];
+        sandbox = false;
+      };
+    };
+  expressionFile = ./package.nix;
+}

tests/nixos/no-new-privileges/package.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{ runCommand, libcap }:
+runCommand "cant-get-capabilities" { nativeBuildInputs = [ libcap.out ]; } ''
+  if [ "$(/run/wrappers/bin/ohno 2>&1)" != "failed to inherit capabilities: Operation not permitted" ]; then
+    echo "Oh no! We gained capabilities!"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  touch $out
+''

tests/nixos/no-new-privileges/sandbox.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+let
+  inherit (import ../util.nix) mkNixBuildTest;
+in
+mkNixBuildTest {
+  name = "no-new-privileges-in-sandbox";
+  extraMachineConfig =
+    { pkgs, ... }:
+    {
+      security.wrappers.ohno = {
+        owner = "root";
+        group = "root";
+        capabilities = "cap_sys_nice=eip";
+        source = "${pkgs.libcap}/bin/getpcaps";
+      };
+      nix.settings.extra-sandbox-paths = [ "/run/wrappers/bin/ohno" ];
+    };
+  expressionFile = ./package.nix;
+}

tests/nixos/root-in-sandbox/default.nix

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-let
-  inherit (import ../util.nix) mkNixBuildTest;
-in mkNixBuildTest {
-  name = "root-in-sandbox";
-  extraMachineConfig = { pkgs, ... }: {
-    security.wrappers.ohno = {
-      owner = "root";
-      group = "root";
-      setuid = true;
-      source = "${pkgs.coreutils}/bin/whoami";
-    };
-    nix.settings.extra-sandbox-paths = ["/run/wrappers/bin"];
-  };
-  expressionFile = ./package.nix;
-}

tests/nixos/root-in-sandbox/package.nix

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{ runCommand }:
-runCommand "cant-get-root-in-sandbox" {} ''
-  if /run/wrappers/bin/ohno; then
-    echo "Oh no! We're root in the sandbox!"
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  touch $out
-''