Nix now requires SQLite and bzip2 to be pre-installed. SQLite is
detected using pkg-config. We required DBD::SQLite anyway, so
depending on SQLite is not a big problem.
The --with-bzip2, --with-openssl and --with-sqlite flags are gone.
By moving the destructor object to libstore.so, it's also run when
download-using-manifests and nix-prefetch-url exit. This prevents
them from cluttering /nix/var/nix/temproots with stale files.
Not all SQLite builds have the function sqlite3_table_column_metadata.
We were only using it in a schema upgrade check for compatibility with
databases that were probably never seen in the wild. So remove it.
The variable ‘useChroot’ was not initialised properly. This caused
random failures if using the build hook. Seen on Mac OS X 10.7 with Clang.
Thanks to KolibriFX for finding this :-)
Chroots are initialised by hard-linking inputs from the Nix store to
the chroot. This doesn't work if the input has its immutable bit set,
because it's forbidden to create hard links to immutable files. So
temporarily clear the immutable bit when creating and destroying the
chroot.
Note that making regular files in the Nix store immutable isn't very
reliable, since the bit can easily become cleared: for instance, if we
run the garbage collector after running ‘nix-store --optimise’. So
maybe we should only make directories immutable.
I was bitten one time too many by Python modifying the Nix store by
creating *.pyc files when run as root. On Linux, we can prevent this
by setting the immutable bit on files and directories (as in ‘chattr
+i’). This isn't supported by all filesystems, so it's not an error
if setting the bit fails. The immutable bit is cleared by the garbage
collector before deleting a path. The only tricky aspect is in
optimiseStore(), since it's forbidden to create hard links to an
immutable file. Thus optimiseStore() temporarily clears the immutable
bit before creating the link.
unreachable paths. This matters when using --max-freed etc.:
unreachable paths could become reachable again, so it's nicer to
keep them if there is "real" garbage to be deleted. Also, don't use
readDirectory() but read the Nix store and delete invalid paths in
parallel. This reduces GC latency on very large Nix stores.
* Buffer the HashSink. This speeds up hashing a bit because it
prevents lots of calls to the hash update functions (e.g. nix-hash
went from 9.3s to 8.7s of user time on the closure of my
/var/run/current-system).
daemon (which is an error), print a nicer error message than
"Connection reset by peer" or "broken pipe".
* In the daemon, log errors that occur during request parameter
processing.
‘nix-store --export’.
* Add a Perl module that provides the functionality of
‘nix-copy-closure --to’. This is used by build-remote.pl so it no
longer needs to start a separate nix-copy-closure process. Also, it
uses the Perl API to do the export, so it doesn't need to start a
separate nix-store process either. As a result, nix-copy-closure
and build-remote.pl should no longer fail on very large closures due
to an "Argument list too long" error. (Note that having very many
dependencies in a single derivation can still fail because the
environment can become too large. Can't be helped though.)
libstore so that the Perl bindings can use it as well. It's vital
that the Perl bindings use the configuration file, because otherwise
nix-copy-closure will fail with a ‘database locked’ message if the
value of ‘use-sqlite-wal’ is changed from the default.
This should also fix:
nix-instantiate: ./../boost/shared_ptr.hpp:254: T* boost::shared_ptr<T>::operator->() const [with T = nix::StoreAPI]: Assertion `px != 0' failed.
which was caused by hashDerivationModulo() calling the ‘store’
object (during store upgrades) before openStore() assigned it.
derivations added to the store by clients have "correct" output
paths (meaning that the output paths are computed by hashing the
derivation according to a certain algorithm). This means that a
malicious user could craft a special .drv file to build *any*
desired path in the store with any desired contents (so long as the
path doesn't already exist). Then the attacker just needs to wait
for a victim to come along and install the compromised path.
For instance, if Alice (the attacker) knows that the latest Firefox
derivation in Nixpkgs produces the path
/nix/store/1a5nyfd4ajxbyy97r1fslhgrv70gj8a7-firefox-5.0.1
then (provided this path doesn't already exist) she can craft a .drv
file that creates that path (i.e., has it as one of its outputs),
add it to the store using "nix-store --add", and build it with
"nix-store -r". So the fake .drv could write a Trojan to the
Firefox path. Then, if user Bob (the victim) comes along and does
$ nix-env -i firefox
$ firefox
he executes the Trojan injected by Alice.
The fix is to have the Nix daemon verify that derivation outputs are
correct (in addValidPath()). This required some refactoring to move
the hash computation code to libstore.
