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Author SHA1 Message Date
alois31 5e0383fa94
tree-wide: unify progress bar inactive and paused states
Previously, the progress bar had two subtly different states in which the bar
would not actually render, both with their own shortcomings: inactive (which
was irreversible) and paused (reversible, but swallowing logs). Furthermore,
there was no way of resetting the statistics, so a very bad solution was
implemented (243c0f18da) that would create a new
logger for each line of the repl, leaking the previous one and discarding the
value of printBuildLogs. Finally, if stderr was not attached to a TTY, the
update thread was started even though the logger was not active, violating the
invariant required by the destructor (which is not observed because the logger
is leaked).

In this commit, the two aforementioned states are unified into a single one,
which can be exited again, correctly upholds the invariant that the update
thread is only running while the progress bar is active, and does not swallow
logs. The latter change in behavior is not expected to be a problems in the
rare cases where the paused state was used before, since other loggers (like
the simple one) don't exhibit it anyway. The startProgressBar/stopProgressBar
API is removed due to being a footgun, and a new method for properly resetting
the progress is added.

Co-Authored-By: Qyriad <qyriad@qyriad.me>
Change-Id: I2b7c3eb17d439cd0c16f7b896cfb61239ac7ff3a
2024-06-30 19:58:40 +02:00
alois31 223735f5f9
libstore/build: use an allowlist approach to syscall filtering
Previously, system call filtering (to prevent builders from storing files with
setuid/setgid permission bits or extended attributes) was performed using a
blocklist. While this looks simple at first, it actually carries significant
security and maintainability risks: after all, the kernel may add new syscalls
to achieve the same functionality one is trying to block, and it can even be
hard to actually add the syscall to the blocklist when building against a C
library that doesn't know about it yet. For a recent demonstration of this
happening in practice to Nix, see the introduction of fchmodat2 [0] [1].

The allowlist approach does not share the same drawback. While it does require
a rather large list of harmless syscalls to be maintained in the codebase,
failing to update this list (and roll out the update to all users) in time has
rather benign effects; at worst, very recent programs that already rely on new
syscalls will fail with an error the same way they would on a slightly older
kernel that doesn't support them yet. Most importantly, no unintended new ways
of performing dangerous operations will be silently allowed.

Another possible drawback is reduced system call performance due to the larger
filter created by the allowlist requiring more computation [2]. However, this
issue has not convincingly been demonstrated yet in practice, for example in
systemd or various browsers.

This commit tries to keep the behavior as close to unchanged as possible. Only
newer syscalls that are not supported by glibc 2.38 (as found in NixOS 23.11)
are blocked. Since this includes fchmodat2, the compatibility code added for
handling this syscall can be removed too.

[0] https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/300635
[1] https://github.com/NixOS/nix/issues/10424
[2] https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/pull/4462#issuecomment-1061690607

Change-Id: I541be3ea9b249bcceddfed6a5a13ac10b11e16ad
2024-06-30 19:58:40 +02:00
alois31 4e5e5e3b08
libstore/build: always treat seccomp setup failures as fatal
In f047e4357b, I missed the behavior that if
building without a dedicated build user (i.e. in single-user setups), seccomp
setup failures are silently ignored. This was introduced without explanation 7
years ago (ff6becafa8). Hopefully the only
use-case nowadays is causing spurious test suite successes when messing up the
seccomp filter during development. Let's try removing it.

Change-Id: Ibe51416d9c7a6dd635c2282990224861adf1ceab
2024-06-30 19:58:40 +02:00
alois31 a55112898e
libexpr/flake: allow automatic rejection of configuration options from flakes
The `allow-flake-configuration` option allows the user to control whether to
accept configuration options supplied by flakes. Unfortunately, setting this
to false really meant "ask each time" (with an option to remember the choice
for each specific option encountered). Let no mean no, and introduce (and
default to) a separate value for the "ask each time" behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Jade Lovelace <lix@jade.fyi>
Change-Id: I7ccd67a95bfc92cffc1ebdc972d243f5191cc1b4
2024-06-30 19:28:14 +02:00
35 changed files with 719 additions and 227 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
---
synopsis: Allow automatic rejection of configuration options from flakes
cls: [1541]
credits: [alois31]
category: Improvements
---
Setting `accept-flake-config` to `false` now respects user choice by automatically rejecting configuration options set by flakes.
The old behaviour of asking each time is still available (and default) by setting it to the special value `ask`.

View file

@ -166,6 +166,7 @@
nixUnstable = prev.nixUnstable;
check-headers = final.buildPackages.callPackage ./maintainers/check-headers.nix { };
check-syscalls = final.buildPackages.callPackage ./maintainers/check-syscalls.nix { };
default-busybox-sandbox-shell = final.busybox.override {
useMusl = true;

View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
runCommandNoCC,
lib,
libseccomp,
writeShellScriptBin,
}:
let
syscalls-csv = runCommandNoCC "syscalls.csv" { } ''
echo ${lib.escapeShellArg libseccomp.src}
tar -xf ${lib.escapeShellArg libseccomp.src} --strip-components=2 ${libseccomp.name}/src/syscalls.csv
mv syscalls.csv "$out"
'';
in
writeShellScriptBin "check-syscalls" ''
${./check-syscalls.sh} ${syscalls-csv}
''

7
maintainers/check-syscalls.sh Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -e
diff -u <(awk < src/libstore/build/local-derivation-goal.cc '/BEGIN extract-syscalls/ { extracting = 1; next }
match($0, /allowSyscall\(ctx, SCMP_SYS\(([^)]*)\)\);|\/\/ skip ([^ ]*)/, result) { print result[1] result[2] }
/END extract-syscalls/ { extracting = 0; next }') <(tail -n+2 "$1" | cut -d, -f 1)

View file

@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation (finalAttrs: {
# Lix specific packages
pre-commit-checks,
contribNotice,
check-syscalls,
}:
let
glibcFix = lib.optionalAttrs (buildPlatform.isLinux && glibcLocales != null) {
@ -465,6 +466,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation (finalAttrs: {
pythonEnv
# docker image tool
skopeo
check-syscalls
just
nixfmt
# Included above when internalApiDocs is true, but we set that to

View file

@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
#include "local-fs-store.hh"
#include "signals.hh"
#include "print.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "gc-small-vector.hh"
#include "users.hh"
@ -300,7 +299,7 @@ ReplExitStatus NixRepl::mainLoop()
/* Stop the progress bar because it interferes with the display of
the repl. */
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
std::string input;
@ -684,9 +683,10 @@ ProcessLineResult NixRepl::processLine(std::string line)
// TODO: this only shows a progress bar for explicitly initiated builds,
// not eval-time fetching or builds performed for IFD.
// But we can't just show it everywhere, since that would erase partial output from evaluation.
startProgressBar();
logger->resetProgress();
logger->resume();
Finally stopLogger([&]() {
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
});
state->store->buildPaths({

View file

@ -51,30 +51,46 @@ void ConfigFile::apply()
else
assert(false);
if (!whitelist.count(baseName) && !nix::fetchSettings.acceptFlakeConfig) {
bool trusted = false;
auto trustedList = readTrustedList();
auto tlname = get(trustedList, name);
if (auto saved = tlname ? get(*tlname, valueS) : nullptr) {
trusted = *saved;
printInfo("Using saved setting for '%s = %s' from ~/.local/share/nix/trusted-settings.json.", name, valueS);
} else {
// FIXME: filter ANSI escapes, newlines, \r, etc.
if (std::tolower(logger->ask(fmt("do you want to allow configuration setting '%s' to be set to '" ANSI_RED "%s" ANSI_NORMAL "' (y/N)?", name, valueS)).value_or('n')) == 'y') {
trusted = true;
}
if (std::tolower(logger->ask(fmt("do you want to permanently mark this value as %s (y/N)?", trusted ? "trusted": "untrusted" )).value_or('n')) == 'y') {
trustedList[name][valueS] = trusted;
writeTrustedList(trustedList);
}
bool trusted = whitelist.count(baseName);
if (!trusted) {
switch (nix::fetchSettings.acceptFlakeConfig) {
case AcceptFlakeConfig::True: {
trusted = true;
break;
}
if (!trusted) {
warn("ignoring untrusted flake configuration setting '%s'.\nPass '%s' to trust it", name, "--accept-flake-config");
continue;
case AcceptFlakeConfig::Ask: {
auto trustedList = readTrustedList();
auto tlname = get(trustedList, name);
if (auto saved = tlname ? get(*tlname, valueS) : nullptr) {
trusted = *saved;
printInfo("Using saved setting for '%s = %s' from ~/.local/share/nix/trusted-settings.json.", name, valueS);
} else {
// FIXME: filter ANSI escapes, newlines, \r, etc.
if (std::tolower(logger->ask(fmt("Do you want to allow configuration setting '%s' to be set to '" ANSI_RED "%s" ANSI_NORMAL "' (y/N)? This may allow the flake to gain root, see the nix.conf manual page.", name, valueS)).value_or('n')) == 'y') {
trusted = true;
} else {
warn("you can set '%s' to '%b' to automatically reject configuration options supplied by flakes", "accept-flake-config", false);
}
if (std::tolower(logger->ask(fmt("do you want to permanently mark this value as %s (y/N)?", trusted ? "trusted": "untrusted" )).value_or('n')) == 'y') {
trustedList[name][valueS] = trusted;
writeTrustedList(trustedList);
}
}
break;
}
case nix::AcceptFlakeConfig::False: {
trusted = false;
break;
};
}
}
globalConfig.set(name, valueS);
if (trusted) {
debug("accepting trusted flake configuration setting '%s'", name);
globalConfig.set(name, valueS);
} else {
warn("ignoring untrusted flake configuration setting '%s', pass '%s' to trust it (may allow the flake to gain root, see the nix.conf manual page)", name, "--accept-flake-config");
}
}
}

View file

@ -1,7 +1,50 @@
#include "abstract-setting-to-json.hh"
#include "args.hh"
#include "config-impl.hh"
#include "fetch-settings.hh"
#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
namespace nix {
template<> AcceptFlakeConfig BaseSetting<AcceptFlakeConfig>::parse(const std::string & str) const
{
if (str == "true") return AcceptFlakeConfig::True;
else if (str == "ask") return AcceptFlakeConfig::Ask;
else if (str == "false") return AcceptFlakeConfig::False;
else throw UsageError("option '%s' has invalid value '%s'", name, str);
}
template<> std::string BaseSetting<AcceptFlakeConfig>::to_string() const
{
if (value == AcceptFlakeConfig::True) return "true";
else if (value == AcceptFlakeConfig::Ask) return "ask";
else if (value == AcceptFlakeConfig::False) return "false";
else abort();
}
template<> void BaseSetting<AcceptFlakeConfig>::convertToArg(Args & args, const std::string & category)
{
args.addFlag({
.longName = name,
.description = "Accept Lix configuration options from flakes without confirmation. This allows flakes to gain root access to your machine if you are a trusted user; see the nix.conf manual page for more details.",
.category = category,
.handler = {[this]() { override(AcceptFlakeConfig::True); }}
});
args.addFlag({
.longName = "ask-" + name,
.description = "Ask whether to accept Lix configuration options from flakes.",
.category = category,
.handler = {[this]() { override(AcceptFlakeConfig::Ask); }}
});
args.addFlag({
.longName = "no-" + name,
.description = "Reject Lix configuration options from flakes.",
.category = category,
.handler = {[this]() { override(AcceptFlakeConfig::False); }}
});
}
FetchSettings::FetchSettings()
{
}

View file

@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
namespace nix {
enum class AcceptFlakeConfig { False, Ask, True };
struct FetchSettings : public Config
{
FetchSettings();
@ -86,15 +88,21 @@ struct FetchSettings : public Config
"Whether to use flake registries to resolve flake references.",
{}, true, Xp::Flakes};
Setting<bool> acceptFlakeConfig{this, false, "accept-flake-config",
Setting<AcceptFlakeConfig> acceptFlakeConfig{
this, AcceptFlakeConfig::Ask, "accept-flake-config",
R"(
Whether to accept Lix configuration from the `nixConfig` attribute of
a flake without prompting. This is almost always a very bad idea.
Setting this setting as a trusted user allows Nix flakes to gain root
a flake. Doing so as a trusted user allows Nix flakes to gain root
access on your machine if they set one of the several
trusted-user-only settings that execute commands as root.
If set to `true`, such configuration will be accepted without asking;
this is almost always a very bad idea. Setting this to `ask` will
prompt the user each time whether to allow a certain configuration
option set this way, and offer to optionally remember their choice.
When set to `false`, the configuration will be automatically
declined.
See [multi-user installations](@docroot@/installation/multi-user.md)
for more details on the Lix security model.
)",

View file

@ -403,11 +403,8 @@ struct GitInputScheme : InputScheme
AutoDelete const _delete{msgPath};
writeFile(msgPath, *commitMsg);
// Pause the logger to allow for user input (such as a gpg passphrase) in `git commit`
logger->pause();
Finally restoreLogger([]() { logger->resume(); });
runProgram("git", true,
{ "-C", *root, "--git-dir", gitDir, "commit", std::string(path.rel()), "-F", msgPath });
{ "-C", *root, "--git-dir", gitDir, "commit", std::string(path.rel()), "-F", msgPath }, true);
}
}
}

View file

@ -44,50 +44,55 @@ static std::string_view storePathToName(std::string_view path)
ProgressBar::ProgressBar(bool isTTY)
: isTTY(isTTY)
{
state_.lock()->active = isTTY;
updateThread = std::thread([&]() {
auto state(state_.lock());
auto nextWakeup = A_LONG_TIME;
while (state->active) {
if (!state->haveUpdate)
state.wait_for(updateCV, nextWakeup);
nextWakeup = draw(*state, {});
state.wait_for(quitCV, std::chrono::milliseconds(50));
}
});
resume();
}
ProgressBar::~ProgressBar()
{
stop();
pause();
}
/* Called by destructor, can't be overridden */
void ProgressBar::stop()
void ProgressBar::pause()
{
{
auto state(state_.lock());
if (!state->active) return;
state->active = false;
writeToStderr("\r\e[K");
updateCV.notify_one();
quitCV.notify_one();
}
updateThread.join();
}
void ProgressBar::pause()
void ProgressBar::resetProgress()
{
state_.lock()->paused = true;
writeToStderr("\r\e[K");
auto state(state_.lock());
auto prevActive = state->active;
*state = ProgressBar::State {
.active = prevActive,
};
update(*state);
}
void ProgressBar::resume()
{
state_.lock()->paused = false;
writeToStderr("\r\e[K");
state_.lock()->haveUpdate = true;
updateCV.notify_one();
if (isTTY) {
auto state(state_.lock());
if (state->active) return;
state->active = true;
state->haveUpdate = true;
updateThread = std::thread([&]() {
auto state(state_.lock());
auto nextWakeup = A_LONG_TIME;
for (;;) {
if (!state->haveUpdate)
state.wait_for(updateCV, nextWakeup);
if (!state->active)
break;
nextWakeup = std::max(draw(*state, {}), std::chrono::milliseconds(50));
}
writeToStderr("\r\e[K");
});
}
}
bool ProgressBar::isVerbose()
@ -318,7 +323,7 @@ std::chrono::milliseconds ProgressBar::draw(State & state, const std::optional<s
auto nextWakeup = A_LONG_TIME;
state.haveUpdate = false;
if (state.paused || !state.active) return nextWakeup;
if (!state.active) return nextWakeup;
auto windowSize = getWindowSize();
auto width = windowSize.second;
@ -559,16 +564,4 @@ Logger * makeProgressBar()
return new ProgressBar(shouldANSI());
}
void startProgressBar()
{
logger = makeProgressBar();
}
void stopProgressBar()
{
auto progressBar = dynamic_cast<ProgressBar *>(logger);
if (progressBar) progressBar->stop();
}
}

View file

@ -48,16 +48,15 @@ struct ProgressBar : public Logger
uint64_t corruptedPaths = 0, untrustedPaths = 0;
bool active = true;
bool paused = false;
bool haveUpdate = true;
bool active = false;
bool haveUpdate = false;
};
Sync<State> state_;
std::thread updateThread;
std::condition_variable quitCV, updateCV;
std::condition_variable updateCV;
bool printBuildLogs = false;
bool printMultiline = false;
@ -67,10 +66,10 @@ struct ProgressBar : public Logger
~ProgressBar();
void stop() override final;
void pause() override;
void resetProgress() override;
void resume() override;
bool isVerbose() override;
@ -113,8 +112,4 @@ struct ProgressBar : public Logger
Logger * makeProgressBar();
void startProgressBar();
void stopProgressBar();
}

View file

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
#include "gc-store.hh"
#include "signals.hh"
#include "loggers.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "current-process.hh"
#include <algorithm>
@ -349,7 +348,7 @@ RunPager::RunPager()
if (!pager) pager = getenv("PAGER");
if (pager && ((std::string) pager == "" || (std::string) pager == "cat")) return;
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
Pipe toPager;
toPager.create();

View file

@ -44,7 +44,6 @@
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
#include "linux/fchmodat2-compat.hh"
#include <seccomp.h>
#endif
#define pivot_root(new_root, put_old) (syscall(SYS_pivot_root, new_root, put_old))
@ -1602,6 +1601,12 @@ void LocalDerivationGoal::chownToBuilder(const Path & path)
throw SysError("cannot change ownership of '%1%'", path);
}
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
void allowSyscall(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, int syscall) {
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall, 0) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
}
#endif
void setupSeccomp()
{
@ -1609,7 +1614,9 @@ void setupSeccomp()
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
if (!(ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW)))
// Pretend that syscalls we don't yet know about don't exist.
// This is the best option for compatibility: after all, they did in fact not exist not too long ago.
if (!(ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOSYS))))
throw SysError("unable to initialize seccomp mode 2");
Finally cleanup([&]() {
@ -1644,28 +1651,520 @@ void setupSeccomp()
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32) != 0)
printError("unable to add mips64el-*abin32 seccomp architecture");
/* Prevent builders from creating setuid/setgid binaries. */
for (int perm : { S_ISUID, S_ISGID }) {
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(chmod), 1,
SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, (scmp_datum_t) perm, (scmp_datum_t) perm)) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
// This list is intended for machine consumption.
// Please keep its format, order and BEGIN/END markers.
//
// Currently, it is up to date with libseccomp 2.5.5 and glibc 2.38.
// Run check-syscalls to determine which new syscalls should be added.
// New syscalls must be audited and handled in a way that blocks the following dangerous operations:
// * Creation of non-empty setuid/setgid files
// * Creation of extended attributes (including ACLs)
//
// BEGIN extract-syscalls
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(accept));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(accept4));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(access));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(acct));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(add_key));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(adjtimex));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(afs_syscall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(alarm));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(arch_prctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(arm_fadvise64_64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(arm_sync_file_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(bdflush));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(bind));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(bpf));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(break));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(breakpoint));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(brk));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(cachectl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(cacheflush));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(cachestat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(capget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(capset));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chdir));
// skip chmod (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chown32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chroot));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_getres));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_getres_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_nanosleep));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_nanosleep_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_settime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_settime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clone));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clone3));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(close));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(close_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(connect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(copy_file_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(creat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(create_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(delete_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(dup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(dup2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(dup3));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_create1));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl_old));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_pwait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_pwait2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait_old));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(eventfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(eventfd2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(execve));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(execveat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(exit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(exit_group));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(faccessat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(faccessat2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fadvise64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fadvise64_64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fallocate));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fanotify_init));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fanotify_mark));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchdir));
// skip fchmod (dangerous)
// skip fchmodat (dangerous)
// skip fchmodat2 (requires glibc 2.39, dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchown32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchownat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fcntl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fdatasync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fgetxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(finit_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(flistxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(flock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fork));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fremovexattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsconfig));
// skip fsetxattr (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsmount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsopen));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fspick));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstatat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstatfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstatfs64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ftime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ftruncate));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ftruncate64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex));
// skip futex_requeue (requires glibc 2.39)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_time64));
// skip futex_wait (requires glibc 2.39)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_waitv));
// skip futex_wake (requires glibc 2.39)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futimesat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getcpu));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getcwd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getdents));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getdents64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getegid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getegid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(geteuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(geteuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgroups));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgroups32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getitimer));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_kernel_syms));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_mempolicy));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpeername));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpgrp));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getppid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpriority));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getrandom));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getrlimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_robust_list));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getrusage));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getsid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getsockname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getsockopt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_thread_area));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(gettid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(gettimeofday));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_tls));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(gtty));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(idle));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(init_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_add_watch));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_init));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_init1));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_rm_watch));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_cancel));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_destroy));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_getevents));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioperm));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_pgetevents));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_pgetevents_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(iopl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioprio_get));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioprio_set));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_setup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_submit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_uring_enter));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_uring_register));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_uring_setup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ipc));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kcmp));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kexec_file_load));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kexec_load));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(keyctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kill));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(landlock_add_rule));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(landlock_create_ruleset));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(landlock_restrict_self));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lchown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lchown32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lgetxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(link));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(linkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(listen));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(listxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(llistxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(_llseek));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lookup_dcookie));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lremovexattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lseek));
// skip lsetxattr (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lstat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(madvise));
// skip map_shadow_stack (requires glibc 2.39)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mbind));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(membarrier));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(memfd_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(memfd_secret));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(migrate_pages));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mincore));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mkdir));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mkdirat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mknod));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mknodat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mlock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mlock2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mlockall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mmap));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mmap2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(modify_ldt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mount_setattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(move_mount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(move_pages));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mprotect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mpx));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_getsetattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_notify));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedreceive));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedreceive_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedsend));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedsend_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_unlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mremap));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgrcv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgsnd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(multiplexer));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(munlock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(munlockall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(munmap));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(name_to_handle_at));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(nanosleep));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(newfstatat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(_newselect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(nfsservctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(nice));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldfstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldlstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldolduname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(olduname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(openat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(openat2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(open_by_handle_at));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(open_tree));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pause));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pciconfig_iobase));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pciconfig_read));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pciconfig_write));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(perf_event_open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(personality));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pidfd_getfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pidfd_open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pidfd_send_signal));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pipe));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pipe2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pivot_root));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pkey_alloc));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pkey_free));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pkey_mprotect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(poll));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ppoll));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ppoll_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(prctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pread64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(preadv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(preadv2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(prlimit64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_madvise));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_mrelease));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_vm_readv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_vm_writev));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(prof));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(profil));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pselect6));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pselect6_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ptrace));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(putpmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pwrite64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pwritev));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pwritev2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(query_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(quotactl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(quotactl_fd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(read));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readahead));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readdir));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readlinkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(reboot));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvfrom));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvmmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvmmsg_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(remap_file_pages));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(removexattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rename));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(renameat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(renameat2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(request_key));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(restart_syscall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(riscv_flush_icache));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rmdir));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rseq));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rtas));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigaction));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigpending));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigqueueinfo));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigreturn));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigsuspend));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigtimedwait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigtimedwait_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_tgsigqueueinfo));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_guarded_storage));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_pci_mmio_read));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_pci_mmio_write));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_runtime_instr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_sthyi));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getaffinity));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getparam));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_get_priority_max));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_get_priority_min));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getscheduler));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_rr_get_interval));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_rr_get_interval_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setaffinity));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setparam));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_yield));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(seccomp));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(security));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(select));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semop));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semtimedop));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semtimedop_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(send));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendfile));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendfile64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendmmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendto));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setdomainname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgroups));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgroups32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sethostname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setitimer));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_mempolicy));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_mempolicy_home_node));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setns));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setpgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setpriority));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setregid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setregid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setreuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setreuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setrlimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_robust_list));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setsid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_thread_area));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_tid_address));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(settimeofday));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_tls));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setuid32));
// skip setxattr (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sgetmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmdt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shutdown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigaction));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigaltstack));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(signal));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(signalfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(signalfd4));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigpending));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigprocmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigreturn));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigsuspend));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(socket));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(socketcall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(socketpair));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(splice));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(spu_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(spu_run));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ssetmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(statfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(statfs64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(statx));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stty));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(subpage_prot));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(swapcontext));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(swapoff));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(swapon));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(switch_endian));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(symlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(symlinkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sync_file_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sync_file_range2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(syncfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(syscall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(_sysctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sys_debug_setcontext));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sysfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sysinfo));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(syslog));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sysmips));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tee));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tgkill));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(time));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_delete));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_gettime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_gettime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_settime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_settime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_getoverrun));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_gettime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_gettime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_settime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_settime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(times));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tkill));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(truncate));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(truncate64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tuxcall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ugetrlimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ulimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(umask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(umount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(umount2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(uname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(unlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(unlinkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(unshare));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(uselib));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(userfaultfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(usr26));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(usr32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ustat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utimensat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utimensat_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utimes));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vfork));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vhangup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vm86));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vm86old));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vmsplice));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vserver));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(wait4));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(waitid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(waitpid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(write));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(writev));
// END extract-syscalls
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmod), 1,
SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, (scmp_datum_t) perm, (scmp_datum_t) perm)) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
// chmod family: prevent adding setuid/setgid bits to existing files.
// The Nix store does not support setuid/setgid, and even their temporary creation can weaken the security of the sandbox.
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(chmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(chmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID, S_ISUID)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(chmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISGID, S_ISGID)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID, S_ISUID)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmod), 1, SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISGID, S_ISGID)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID, S_ISUID)) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), 1, SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISGID, S_ISGID)) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), 1,
SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, (scmp_datum_t) perm, (scmp_datum_t) perm)) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2, 1,
SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, (scmp_datum_t) perm, (scmp_datum_t) perm)) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
}
/* Prevent builders from creating EAs or ACLs. Not all filesystems
support these, and they're not allowed in the Nix store because
they're not representable in the NAR serialisation. */
// setxattr family: prevent creation of extended attributes or ACLs.
// Not all filesystems support them, and they're incompatible with the NAR format.
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(setxattr), 0) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(lsetxattr), 0) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(fsetxattr), 0) != 0)
@ -1699,11 +2198,7 @@ void LocalDerivationGoal::runChild()
commonChildInit();
try {
setupSeccomp();
} catch (...) {
if (buildUser) throw;
}
setupSeccomp();
bool setUser = true;

View file

@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
/*
* Determine the syscall number for `fchmodat2`.
*
* On most platforms this is 452. Exceptions can be found on
* a glibc git checkout via `rg --pcre2 'define __NR_fchmodat2 (?!452)'`.
*
* The problem is that glibc 2.39 and libseccomp 2.5.5 are needed to
* get the syscall number. However, a Lix built against nixpkgs 23.11
* (glibc 2.38) should still have the issue fixed without depending
* on the build environment.
*
* To achieve that, the macros below try to determine the platform and
* set the syscall number which is platform-specific, but
* in most cases 452.
*
* TODO: remove this when 23.11 is EOL and the entire (supported) ecosystem
* is on glibc 2.39.
*/
#pragma once
///@file
#if defined(__alpha__)
# define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 562
#elif defined(__x86_64__) && SIZE_MAX == 0xFFFFFFFF // x32
# define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 1073742276
#elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__mips64) && defined(_ABIN64) // mips64/n64
# define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 5452
#elif defined(__mips__) && defined(__mips64) && defined(_ABIN32) // mips64/n32
# define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 6452
#elif defined(__mips__) && defined(_ABIO32) // mips32
# define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 4452
#else
# define NIX_SYSCALL_FCHMODAT2 452
#endif

View file

@ -117,9 +117,8 @@ public:
virtual ~Logger() { }
virtual void stop() { };
virtual void pause() { };
virtual void resetProgress() { };
virtual void resume() { };
// Whether the logger prints the whole build log

View file

@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static void main_nix_build(int argc, char * * argv)
restoreProcessContext();
logger->stop();
logger->pause();
execvp(shell->c_str(), argPtrs.data());
@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static void main_nix_build(int argc, char * * argv)
outPaths.push_back(outputPath);
}
logger->stop();
logger->pause();
for (auto & path : outPaths)
std::cout << store->printStorePath(path) << '\n';

View file

@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
#include "shared.hh"
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "local-fs-store.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
@ -143,7 +142,7 @@ struct CmdBuild : InstallablesCommand, MixDryRun, MixJSON, MixProfile
createOutLinks(outLink, buildables, *store2);
if (printOutputPaths) {
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
for (auto & buildable : buildables) {
std::visit(overloaded {
[&](const BuiltPath::Opaque & bo) {

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@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "fs-accessor.hh"
#include "nar-accessor.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
using namespace nix;
@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ struct MixCat : virtual Args
auto file = accessor->readFile(path);
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
writeFull(STDOUT_FILENO, file);
}
};

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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "outputs-spec.hh"
#include "derivations.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "run.hh"
#include <iterator>
@ -690,7 +689,7 @@ struct CmdPrintDevEnv : Common, MixJSON
{
auto buildEnvironment = getBuildEnvironment(store, installable).first;
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
if (json) {
logger->writeToStdout(buildEnvironment.toJSON());

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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
#include "command.hh"
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "archive.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
using namespace nix;
@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ struct CmdDumpPath : StorePathCommand
void run(ref<Store> store, const StorePath & storePath) override
{
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
FdSink sink(STDOUT_FILENO);
store->narFromPath(storePath, sink);
sink.flush();
@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ struct CmdDumpPath2 : Command
void run() override
{
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
FdSink sink(STDOUT_FILENO);
dumpPath(path, sink);
sink.flush();

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@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
#include "shared.hh"
#include "eval.hh"
#include "attr-path.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "editor-for.hh"
#include "current-process.hh"
@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ struct CmdEdit : InstallableCommand
}
}();
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
auto args = editorFor(file, line);

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@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
#include "eval.hh"
#include "eval-inline.hh"
#include "value-to-json.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include <nlohmann/json.hpp>
@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ struct CmdEval : MixJSON, InstallableCommand, MixReadOnlyOption
}
if (writeTo) {
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
if (pathExists(*writeTo))
throw Error("path '%s' already exists", *writeTo);
@ -114,7 +113,7 @@ struct CmdEval : MixJSON, InstallableCommand, MixReadOnlyOption
}
else if (raw) {
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
writeFull(STDOUT_FILENO, *state->coerceToString(noPos, *v, context, "while generating the eval command output"));
}

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@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
#include "shared.hh"
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "log-store.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
using namespace nix;
@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ struct CmdLog : InstallableCommand
auto log = logSub.getBuildLog(path);
if (!log) continue;
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
printInfo("got build log for '%s' from '%s'", installable->what(), logSub.getUri());
writeFull(STDOUT_FILENO, *log);
return;

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@ -346,8 +346,6 @@ void mainWrapped(int argc, char * * argv)
}
#endif
Finally f([] { logger->stop(); });
programPath = argv[0];
auto programName = std::string(baseNameOf(programPath));
@ -363,7 +361,8 @@ void mainWrapped(int argc, char * * argv)
evalSettings.pureEval = true;
setLogFormat("bar");
setLogFormat(LogFormat::bar);
Finally f([] { logger->pause(); });
settings.verboseBuild = false;
if (isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) {
verbosity = lvlNotice;

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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
#include "command.hh"
#include "common-args.hh"
#include "loggers.hh"
#include "shared.hh"
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "filetransfer.hh"
#include "finally.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "tarfile.hh"
#include "attr-path.hh"
#include "eval-inline.hh"
@ -180,10 +180,8 @@ static int main_nix_prefetch_url(int argc, char * * argv)
if (args.size() > 2)
throw UsageError("too many arguments");
Finally f([]() { stopProgressBar(); });
if (isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
startProgressBar();
setLogFormat(LogFormat::bar);
auto store = openStore();
auto state = std::make_unique<EvalState>(myArgs.searchPath, store);
@ -237,7 +235,7 @@ static int main_nix_prefetch_url(int argc, char * * argv)
auto [storePath, hash] = prefetchFile(
store, resolveMirrorUrl(*state, url), name, ht, expectedHash, unpack, executable);
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
if (!printPath)
printInfo("path is '%s'", store->printStorePath(storePath));

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@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
#include "local-store.hh"
#include "finally.hh"
#include "fs-accessor.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "eval.hh"
#include "build/personality.hh"
#include "current-process.hh"
@ -31,7 +30,7 @@ void runProgramInStore(ref<Store> store,
const Strings & args,
std::optional<std::string_view> system)
{
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
restoreProcessContext();

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@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "thread-pool.hh"
#include "signals.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include <atomic>
@ -222,7 +221,7 @@ struct CmdKey : NixMultiCommand
if (!command)
throw UsageError("'nix key' requires a sub-command.");
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
command->second->run();
}
};

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@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
#include "eval-settings.hh"
#include "attr-path.hh"
#include "names.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
using namespace nix;
@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ struct CmdUpgradeNix : MixDryRun, EvalCommand
auto version = DrvName(storePath.name()).version;
if (dryRun) {
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
warn("would upgrade to version %s", version);
return;
}
@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ struct CmdUpgradeNix : MixDryRun, EvalCommand
throw Error("could not verify that '%s' works", program);
}
stopProgressBar();
logger->pause();
auto const fullStorePath = store->printStorePath(storePath);

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@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
#include "command.hh"
#include "store-api.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "fs-accessor.hh"
#include "shared.hh"
@ -110,7 +109,7 @@ struct CmdWhyDepends : SourceExprCommand, MixOperateOnOptions
auto dependencyPath = *optDependencyPath;
auto dependencyPathHash = dependencyPath.hashPart();
stopProgressBar(); // FIXME
logger->pause(); // FIXME
auto accessor = store->getFSAccessor();

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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ NIX_CONFIG='
experimental-features = nix-command
accept-flake-config = true
' nix config show accept-flake-config 1>$TEST_ROOT/stdout 2>$TEST_ROOT/stderr
grepQuiet "false" $TEST_ROOT/stdout
grepQuiet "ask" $TEST_ROOT/stdout
grepQuiet "Ignoring setting 'accept-flake-config' because experimental feature 'flakes' is not enabled" $TEST_ROOT/stderr
# 'flakes' experimental-feature is disabled after, ignore and warn
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ NIX_CONFIG='
accept-flake-config = true
experimental-features = nix-command
' nix config show accept-flake-config 1>$TEST_ROOT/stdout 2>$TEST_ROOT/stderr
grepQuiet "false" $TEST_ROOT/stdout
grepQuiet "ask" $TEST_ROOT/stdout
grepQuiet "Ignoring setting 'accept-flake-config' because experimental feature 'flakes' is not enabled" $TEST_ROOT/stderr
# 'flakes' experimental-feature is enabled before, process

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@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ nix build < /dev/null
(! [[ -f post-hook-ran ]])
clearStore
# likewise with no-accept-flake-config
nix build --no-accept-flake-config
(! [[ -f post-hook-ran ]])
clearStore
nix build --accept-flake-config
test -f post-hook-ran || fail "The post hook should have ran"

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@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <assert.h>
int main(void) {
char *name = getenv("out");
FILE *fd = fopen(name, "w");
fprintf(fd, "henlo :3");
fclose(fd);
// FIXME use something nicer here that's less
// platform-dependent as soon as we go to 24.05
// and the glibc is new enough to support fchmodat2
long rs = syscall(452, NULL, name, S_ISUID, 0);
assert(rs == -1);
assert(errno == EPERM);
}

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@ -4,17 +4,6 @@
let
pkgs = config.nodes.machine.nixpkgs.pkgs;
fchmodat2-builder = pkgs.runCommandCC "fchmodat2-suid" {
passAsFile = [ "code" ];
code = builtins.readFile ./fchmodat2-suid.c;
# Doesn't work with -O0, shuts up the warning about that.
hardeningDisable = [ "fortify" ];
} ''
mkdir -p $out/bin/
$CC -x c "$codePath" -O0 -g -o $out/bin/fchmodat2-suid
'';
in
{
name = "setuid";
@ -27,26 +16,13 @@ in
virtualisation.additionalPaths = [
pkgs.stdenvNoCC
pkgs.pkgsi686Linux.stdenvNoCC
fchmodat2-builder
];
# need at least 6.6 to test for fchmodat2
boot.kernelPackages = pkgs.linuxKernel.packages.linux_6_6;
};
testScript = { nodes }: ''
# fmt: off
start_all()
with subtest("fchmodat2 suid regression test"):
machine.succeed("""
nix-build -E '(with import <nixpkgs> {}; runCommand "fchmodat2-suid" {
BUILDER = builtins.storePath ${fchmodat2-builder};
} "
exec \\"$BUILDER\\"/bin/fchmodat2-suid
")'
""")
# Copying to /tmp should succeed.
machine.succeed(r"""
nix-build --no-sandbox -E '(with import <nixpkgs> {}; runCommand "foo" {} "

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@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#include "eval.hh"
#include "progress-bar.hh"
#include "loggers.hh"
#include "logging.hh"
#include "shared.hh"
@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ namespace nix
initNix();
initGC();
startProgressBar();
setLogFormat(LogFormat::bar);
ASSERT_NE(dynamic_cast<ProgressBar *>(logger), nullptr);
ProgressBar & progressBar = dynamic_cast<ProgressBar &>(*logger);