With this patch, and this file I called `log.py`:
#!/usr/bin/env nix-shell
#!nix-shell -i python3 -p python3 --pure
import sys
from pprint import pprint
stack = []
timestack = []
for line in open(sys.argv[1]):
components = line.strip().split(" ", 2)
if components[0] != "function-trace":
continue
direction = components[1]
components = components[2].rsplit(" ", 2)
loc = components[0]
_at = components[1]
time = int(components[2])
if direction == "entered":
stack.append(loc)
timestack.append(time)
elif direction == "exited":
dur = time - timestack.pop()
vst = ";".join(stack)
print(f"{vst} {dur}")
stack.pop()
and:
nix-instantiate --trace-function-calls -vvvv ../nixpkgs/pkgs/top-level/release.nix -A unstable > log.matthewbauer 2>&1
./log.py ./log.matthewbauer > log.matthewbauer.folded
flamegraph.pl --title matthewbauer-post-pr log.matthewbauer.folded > log.matthewbauer.folded.svg
I can make flame graphs like: http://gsc.io/log.matthewbauer.folded.svg
---
Includes test cases around function call failures and tryEval. Uses
RAII so the finish is always called at the end of the function.
In EvalState::checkSourcePath, the path is checked against the list of
allowed paths first and later it's checked again *after* resolving
symlinks.
The resolving of the symlinks is done via canonPath, which also strips
out "../" and "./". However after the canonicalisation the error message
pointing out that the path is not allowed prints the symlink target in
the error message.
Even if we'd suppress the message, symlink targets could still be leaked
if the symlink target doesn't exist (in this case the error is thrown in
canonPath).
So instead, we now do canonPath() without symlink resolving first before
even checking against the list of allowed paths and then later do the
symlink resolving and checking the allowed paths again.
The first call to canonPath() should get rid of all the "../" and "./",
so in theory the only way to leak a symlink if the attacker is able to
put a symlink in one of the paths allowed by restricted evaluation mode.
For the latter I don't think this is part of the threat model, because
if the attacker can write to that path, the attack vector is even
larger.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@nix.build>
This reduces the risk of object liveness misdetection. For example,
Glibc has an internal variable "mp_" that often points to a Boehm
object, keeping it alive unnecessarily. Since we don't store any
actual roots in global variables, we can just disable data segment
scanning.
With this, the max RSS doing 100 evaluations of
nixos.tests.firefox.x86_64-linux.drvPath went from 718 MiB to 455 MiB.
If the Env denotes a 'with', then values[0] may be an Expr* cast to a
Value*. For code that generically traverses Values/Envs, it's useful
to know this.
E.g. this makes
nix eval --restrict-eval -I /nix/store/foo '(builtins.readFile "/nix/store/foo/symlink/bla")'
(where /nix/store/foo/symlink is a symlink to another path in the
closure of /nix/store/foo) succeed.
This fixes a regression in Hydra compared to Nix 1.x (where there were
no restrictions at all on access to the Nix store).
builtins.path allows specifying the name of a path (which makes paths
with store-illegal names now addable), allows adding paths with flat
instead of recursive hashes, allows specifying a filter (so is a
generalization of filterSource), and allows specifying an expected
hash (enabling safe path adding in pure mode).
In this mode, the following restrictions apply:
* The builtins currentTime, currentSystem and storePath throw an
error.
* $NIX_PATH and -I are ignored.
* fetchGit and fetchMercurial require a revision hash.
* fetchurl and fetchTarball require a sha256 attribute.
* No file system access is allowed outside of the paths returned by
fetch{Git,Mercurial,url,Tarball}. Thus 'nix build -f ./foo.nix' is
not allowed.
Thus, the evaluation result is completely reproducible from the
command line arguments. E.g.
nix build --pure-eval '(
let
nix = fetchGit { url = https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git; rev = "9c927de4b179a6dd210dd88d34bda8af4b575680"; };
nixpkgs = fetchGit { url = https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs.git; ref = "release-17.09"; rev = "66b4de79e3841530e6d9c6baf98702aa1f7124e4"; };
in (import (nix + "/release.nix") { inherit nix nixpkgs; }).build.x86_64-linux
)'
The goal is to enable completely reproducible and traceable
evaluation. For example, a NixOS configuration could be fully
described by a single Git commit hash. 'nixos-rebuild' would do
something like
nix build --pure-eval '(
(import (fetchGit { url = file:///my-nixos-config; rev = "..."; })).system
')
where the Git repository /my-nixos-config would use further fetchGit
calls or Git externals to fetch Nixpkgs and whatever other
dependencies it has. Either way, the commit hash would uniquely
identify the NixOS configuration and allow it to reproduced.
Linus Heckemann
